

A Sacramental Humanism

Regaining control of economic, social and political structures is a key task
for which we need more than revolutionary techniques and global strategies.

PAUL VERGHESE

✦ CHANGE of the mind, like growth of the body, is generally imperceptible. As the body sloughs off cells and forms new ones, so the mind quietly casts aside thoughts and ideas and replaces them by others. Only occasionally — at pubescence and middle age, for instance — are there more dramatic changes.

Theologically, I seem during this past decade to have passed through pubescence and come into a cantankerous and boisterous adolescence. Not that I like too much to talk theology. My deliverance from childhood — that is, from Western tutelage — has taught me above all the wisdom of silence. That way, one's contribution to the cacophony of nonsense is at least drastically reduced.

I

A father-figure comes in handy for the adolescent's discovery of self-identity — especially if the figure is dominant and powerful enough to make one's revolt look all the more heroic. For me, Augustine of Hippo was such a figure. What a release it was to learn, in 1959-60, that he was the spring and fount of all creative Western theology, and then to make the gratifying discovery that this source was poisoned! I had already discovered that, as an Eastern Christian, I did not even need to call Augustine a saint. His name appears neither on our liturgical calendar nor in our manuals of theology. The Eastern tradition had wisely ignored him and felt none the poorer for it. What if my supervisor at Oxford insisted that only Western thinkers like Augustine could think problems through? It was this well known professor's incapacity to understand Eastern thought, together with his adoption of Augustinianism as a standard by which to measure the doctrines of others, that prompted my revolt. (I refer to J. N. D. Kelly, whose *Early Christian Doctrines* summarizes his theological views.)

Quite seriously, I believe today that Western theology cannot reorient itself until it takes a second look at some of Augustine's basic ideas. This is not the place to enter into a full criticism. Let me merely indicate five areas where re-examination could reveal basic flaws in Augustine's thought.

First, Augustine's low view of matter leads him to

a low view of the incarnation of our Lord. Taking his cue from the early Athanasius, the bishop thought of the incarnate body primarily as a come-on drawing us to contemplation of loftier spiritual realities. The material body of our Lord was but an instrument of revelation.

Second, and probably because of the same vestigial Manicheanism which undervalued matter, Augustine had a low view of this world. The polarity in his thinking between the *civitas mundi* and the *civitas Dei* can only be termed alarming. Western theology is still learning to correct this basic error which has had so many consequences.

Third, because his view of the human element in the incarnation is so low, he holds a low view of man. By taking sin as almost constitutive of human nature, Augustine led the Western church astray — toward denial of the freedom and dignity of all men, Christian or non-Christian. He makes man so utterly dependent and slavish in relation to God that God is distorted into an arbitrary dictator like the Caesars — a petty God whose glory has to be vindicated at the expense of the glory of man. But only a God who can be glorified in the glory of man is worth worshiping.

Fourth, Augustine's soteriology went wrong because of his preoccupation with individual and personal sin, original and actual. Salvation is more than deliverance from sin. It is making man like God, bringing him into the fullness of humanity. We today are caught in a negative and individual view of salvation.

Fifth, by his failure to understand the sacramental principle as integral to the human condition and to the incarnation (man is a citizen of two worlds), Augustine contributed to a substantial distortion of the sacraments as accommodations of spiritual realities to suit the grossness of man. His misconception of the ordained ministry is also a result of his misunderstanding of the true relation of word to sacrament.

These five points (I state them in shorthand) are crucial for the understanding of what Christianity is all about, and my change of mind in the past ten years can be said to focus on them. Any dialogue between East and West must begin on these points, and we may find that, Christianity being after all an Eastern religion, the ancient Eastern approach Augustine deviated from still has much to say to us.

Fr. Verghese is principal of the (Syrian) Orthodox Theological Seminary, Kottayam, Kerala, India.

"Augustine will survive your criticism," another all-knowing professor told me some time ago, without making any attempt to understand what I was saying. Augustine probably will survive, for he deserves to. He was a great genius, a spiritual and intellectual giant. My purpose is not to destroy his reputation but to seek the renewal of theology in a truly ecumenical context, rather than in the shallow atmosphere and narrow confines of a secular urban-technological civilization in an Augustinian framework. It is the survival of the Western interpretation of the Christian faith that I have grave doubts about.

My reaction against Augustinianism did not lead me to a superficial liberal theology (as it did many in the West in the earlier decades of our century). I now subscribe to a sacramental and ecclesiological humanism.

II

A second major change in my mind has been a growing skepticism about the power of words. The printing press seems to have destroyed the power of

How My Mind Has Changed

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE IN A SERIES

the written word, and excesses in speech-making destroyed the power of the spoken word long ago.

The theologian sometimes thinks that the problem of the church today is the lack of the right words — in short, of a relevant theology. But the world is not waiting for new words; it is waiting for Godot — a pattern of life, a type of personality, a way of living, being, doing, thinking. It is our professional bias that makes us think a new theology will solve our problems. Only God is going to solve our problems. Perhaps, however, a new pattern of living the Christian life may open the way.

This faulty reliance on words and forms of words is found not only in the West. Here in India too many people talk and talk and talk about an "indigenous" theology as the cure-all — but never produce one. For a fresh theology has to come out of a new way of living the Christian life in Indian conditions. Such a new way of life is both the matrix and the authentication of a new theology anywhere. Young people especially are looking for a person or a type that is authentic, not for new words.

What a misunderstanding it is to think that communication takes place mainly by words! Voice and ear and even the conscious mind form but part of the communication system between human beings. Psychologists have been long at work on the role of "kinesic and paralinguistic information" in communication. Our actions, our gestures, the very lines on our faces, all communicate.

Thus I have come to believe that being and doing are more important than speaking in communication. And anyone can see how that belief in itself devalues theology considerably.

III

A third area in which my mind has changed in the past ten years is in regard to the dialectic between structural relations and personal relations. I had never quite seen how the larger framework of society substantially affected personality. But by observing the faces of people of various nationalities and religious groups, I began to see that structural values and national ethos can change a person's face and also that a facial change is always the result of a change in personality. This conclusion was reinforced as I watched those of my own countrymen who had spent five or six years studying abroad. I discovered that each country sojourned in produced a different type of personality. Even the particular institution attended made a difference.

But more important for me was the "middle level" — that between large structural relationships, as in the nation, and intimate personal relationship, as in the family. The small group, in which intimacy and a degree of independence are combined and structural relations are consciously accepted — such now seems to me the milieu in which the new humanity can be most effectively shaped, both as a social structure and as "individual" persons. Such a group must be a school for its members, a place where work, worship, study, play, property rela-

tions, recreation and repose are all suitably balanced in order to shape a new type of personality which will work actively for the transformation of society. More than any new theology, we need many such pioneering, committed, socially alert groups.


IV

A fourth area in which my mind has changed is closely related to the third. I have come to a new — or rather, a very old — understanding of freedom. Freedom in the positive sense means creativity that is spontaneous, not caused by external pressures; it is the capacity to conceive the good in new forms and then to create that good. To be free also means not to be directed by one's passions and ambitions or deterred from action by false inhibitions and complexes. Freedom is something given to man so that, while being part of creation, he can himself become a creator and alter the shape, the direction and the meaning of creation.

The fresh insight for me lay in understanding freedom in a structural context. Not that I had chosen sides in the argument between Claude Lévi-Strauss and Jean-Paul Sartre, between structuralism and existentialism. On the contrary, I saw that individual freedom is inseparable from the freedom of the collective (the community) to choose its own goals as a society and to work to achieve them. Ultimately it is humanity that must be free. The measure of freedom that a Gandhi, a Sartre, a Jean Genet, a St. Francis is able to acquire is but an incentive to society to seek its own freedom as part of the human community. Sartre and Genet go wrong simply because they have insisted on their individual freedom without in the same act choosing also the freedom of mankind. The individual quest for freedom takes place in an alienated framework. It can bring only misery so long as my intention is to establish my identity over against "the masses." No matter if I become one of the masses provided that thereby the masses would become free; for in their freedom — i.e., in their capacity to conceive, choose and attain the good — I shall find my own fulfillment. My fairly total abandonment of the two extremes of existentialist and structuralist philosophy and theology may be understood in this context.

V

A fifth area of significant change is in my understanding of mission and missions. For a long time I had suspected that modern Catholic and Protestant missions were expressions of the cultural and economic aggressiveness of the West — though probably a certain aggressiveness has always characterized Christian mission. However, during the past ten years I have had occasion to "watch the show" from inside, and my negative reaction to the mission of the Western church has developed to a high pitch.



Fr. Vergheze

The basic mistake of Western mission is not so much cultural aggression as missionary colonialism. Never before in church history has mission been as completely institutionalized as in the years since 1500 which saw the expansion of the West. In the previous centuries when a missionary went to another country to evangelize he preached the gospel, established the church and probably died there. There was no need for a second generation of missionaries, though occasionally a teacher or a bishop might visit the mission field.

But this idea that missionaries must go in every generation, that they should be organized, their finances looked after, life and medical insurance provided, cars, bungalows and compounds furnished — all that seems to me to kill mission. Today it is economic imperialism or neocolonialism that is the pattern in missions. Relief agencies and mission boards control the younger churches through the purse-strings. Foreign finances, ideas and personnel still dominate the younger churches and stifle their spontaneous growth.

My disgust with this pattern has made me suspect even the ecumenical movement. Catholic and Protestant seem to be collaborators in this neocolonialist domination and Western cultural imperialism in the ecclesiastical sphere. So now I say, "The mission of the church is the greatest enemy of the gospel." I began to say it 15 years ago, rather softly. Very rarely did I find any creative response. Therefore I have decided to be rude and rough about this matter. I still do not have much hope that the Western churches (or even the dependent non-Western churches) will see the point, because to see

it is to be pushed to most drastic changes in church life both in the West and in the rest.

VI

A sixth area in which my mind has changed in the past ten years is that of the relation between sacrament and society. Today I can accept only a sacramental-ecclesiological social ethics. The stuff that comes out of ecumenical conferences claiming to be Christian social ethics bores me no end. I can understand human society only on the analogy of the church. My notions of social justice come from my understanding of the communion of saints. And I can understand the ministry of the church in the world only in terms of a fresh understanding of the sacramental principle and the sacramental ministry. But how can I even indicate here the scope of my book-length thoughts in these areas?

Finally, my mind has changed in relation to the nature and destiny of man. I now firmly believe that the destiny of man is to be like God in every respect except that of being a noncreature; i.e., God is the source of his own being, but man's being will always be derived from God. Yet in love, wisdom and power, as well as in holiness — which is after all something more than the combination of these three — man must become like God. That alone gives me a new perspective for understanding the human vocation on earth and beyond. Again, a book-length idea.

Without being pedantic and academic, one could say that what God has done in Christ has consequences for all men. To use Roman Catholic terminology, all men, Christians and non-Christians, are

in the realm of "supernatural grace" stemming from the incarnation. The death and resurrection of Jesus Christ make a difference for the history of the world and the destiny of mankind. All the secular ideas and forces smacking of salvation that are in vogue today come from the Christ event and the Judeo-Christian tradition.

Man's attempt to build a tower of Babel was reprimanded and frustrated by God. Today, God allows man to build many towers of Babel — to go to extremes of *hubris* and blasphemy, to defy the divine and erect a secular city. That is, man always goes to the edge of catastrophe — "brinkism" is his delight. Yet God has lengthened man's rope, so that even in the misuse of freedom he can travel far. Will God finally let go? He well may. Catastrophe is quite conceivable, and even the resurrection of Christ (*pace* Moltmann and Pannenberg) does not provide insurance against it. For the same Lord predicted both his own resurrection and the apocalyptic denouement of creation. Nor does the fact of hope (*à la* Bloch) provide a sufficient basis for the notion that things will work out for mankind in history.

VII

In other words, there is no basis for the liberal hope of building the urban technological paradise. There was a time when I thought that the movement toward the Kingdom of God and the movement toward the urban technological society would merge somewhere. I now have second thoughts. Certainly neither the affluent society with its pressure for consumption and the resultant bloated egos, nor the regimented society with its repression of so much that is creative in man, shows us the way to paradise. Alienation and nuclear destruction are twin giants threatening mankind.

These days I think of disarmament and reconciliation as the proximate goals which would lead us in the direction of the Kingdom. Science and technology now have their own momentum and can go on without assistance from the church.

Disarmament and reconciliation are integrally related in my mind. Alienation should be tackled at all its four levels: the chasm that separates urban-technical man from God should be bridged; man must regain control of the structures — economic, social and political — that now hold him prisoner; nations, groups and individuals must learn again to trust and have compassion for each other; man must find himself, not in a whirl of activity but in the depths of silence. These four elements together I call "disalienation."

A concrete place to begin is the third area — the disalienation of nations and groups. Here disarmament is to be seen as a positive program. Centralized and widely controlled power should eliminate group conflicts, and resources now wasted in build-

ing up arms reserves should be diverted to science, education, the elimination of poverty and the enhancement of human creativity. Only in trying to build a united and unified humanity can we rediscover the way to God as well as our own being. Regaining control of economic, social and political structures is a key task for which we need more than revolutionary techniques and global strategies. Only a corps of men and women, distributed all over the

world, ready to labor and die for the cause, can pioneer the movement for disalienation. And the spiritual dynamism for such a pioneering movement (such as the communist movement once was) can come today only out of a more profound understanding of Semitic Christianity.

I have made no attempt here to be systematic, thorough or detailed. The mind keeps changing, and changing still.

Alternative World Models— Some Perplexities about Social Reconstruction

BISHOP PAUL GREGORIOS*

This is a pleasant though dangerous game, this playing with world order models. The Club of Rome has made the game popular. Their first report on *Limits to Growth* (1972) and then their new Gospel of Z.P.G. plus Z.E.G. (Zero Population Growth plus Zero Economic Growth) as the only option left for mankind have now become more academic curiosities than authentic world models. *Mankind at the Turning Point* (1974—The Club of Rome's Second Report), while more sure and balanced, yet provided no blue-print for the world of the year 2000. By the time the Club of Rome came to its third major meeting in Algiers last autumn, they had practically abandoned the game of world models and of cybernetic prophecy. The Leontieff Report and the Tinbergen Report now before the U.N. use a more ad hoc, problem-solving approach in preference to a model-building approach. They are both refusing to play the game of world order models.

To what extent are we justified in building world order models at all? Only to the extent to which they can illuminate the way we have to move ahead from where we are. We do not build human societies from whole cloth. Most of the time we can only do maintenance and repairing ; even remodelling is beyond our reach. Humanity is not metal and cement out of which reinforced concrete can be shaped to order. Human engineering is so totally different from civil engineering that it is quite perilous to apply the principles of the latter to the former.

(I)

To deal with human beings as if they were merely commensurable units of production and distribution seems one of the fundamental follies of our unimaginatively metric minds and our woodenly cybernetic imaginations. Social structure is more than an aggregation of individuals as the family is more than a contract between individuals. Human freedom is the element that makes human beings different from sheep or goats. In many ways human beings do behave like sheep and goats, but there are times when they assert their freedom and refuse to be led. Human beings are also different from snakes and foxes in their greater capacity for deception as well as for self-deception.

*Principal, Orthodox Theological Seminar, Kottayam.

But then it is equally mis-leading to regard human beings as simply individuals. We are all prone to this characteristic middle class temptation. Even a most benign and erudite prophet like Abraham Maslow falls into this middle-class or bourgeois error of seeing human development primarily as individual personal development. His hierarchy of needs as diagrammed in Gerry and Pat Mische's new book¹ suffers from the distortion that the individualist optique supplies. Even when they speak of the meta-needs including the concept of "integral unity with the Great self" or realization of the "God within", the old fallacy of the "alone with the alone" as the scenario of mystical union shows through. To quote the Misches' version of Maslow's theory: "Highly self-actualized persons are highly individualized in the development of their uniqueness as persons and by the very same process of deeper inwardness share deeper unity and harmony with all other persons and whole of life"²

So long as we keep individual models like Jesus, Gandhi and King as our goal for human development, we are likely to remain within the individualist strait jacket even in our effort at bonding, coupling, unity with all, and search for global structures. Both Maslow and the Misches admit that "we need a healthy social framework within which to become—individually and as a species—all that we can be". But they do not always see that social framework as more than an instrument. It is itself the expression of what human beings are, and human beings cannot afford to conceive the social structure as merely instrumental to personal growth and development. The social structure is part of what human beings are. They do not exist apart from it or independently of it.

I am not sure that the point I am making in this first part of my talk is sufficiently clear. First, human engineering or the shaping of human society should not be seen on the analogy of civil engineering. We do not make a blue-print, specify measures and materials, and construct a global society as if it were a bridge or a dam. The human material cannot be objectified and manipulated as if they were building-materials for a house or a school. Second, social structure, whether familial, local, national or global, is not an instrument subsidiary to human development. Social structures are not things to be objectified, computerized or manipulated. They are part of human existence. Change in social structure is change in the social being of humanity and not merely ancillary to it. A human being is not an individual who grows into an adult and then seeks relationships with others. It is in that relationship that he or she is shaped and that relationship and its

1. *Toward A Human World Order*, Paulist Press, 1977.

2. *ibid*, p-28.

structure is part of his or her very being. Social values are the matrix of, and not an appendix to, personal values.

Making the good society is thus not a simple act of making something out there, outside of ourselves. A global system or a human world order means a new kind of humanity. It is not to be constructed as something like a house or even as a voluntary association. It is a corporate self-disciplining of humanity by itself. Such self-disciplining involves setting visions of a new goal, and setting one's mind and heart and will to pursue that goal. It is in the sense of seeing a vision that we can think of world order models. It has the value primarily of motivating people and giving them an orientation. When we actually get nearer to the goal, it might look quite different, because what we are doing is actually restructuring ourselves. Man is not an object, but a subject.

(II)

My second point is to refer to a possible error or fallacy in our conception of the role of governments, both in national and global visions. It is not simply the question of the National Security State, which is indeed a very illuminating concept helping in a fresh understanding of the problem.

There was a time when the symbol of the state was the sword and the sceptre. Today it is bureaucracy, the desk, the office, the chair of authority, the board, the committee. But bureaucracy is by no means a monopoly of the state. We all have our little bureaucracies, and perhaps the most powerful bureaucracies, are the industrial bureaucracies, most of them privately controlled. They possess the power of production and distribution. We have thus to cope with two sets of bureaucracies—one governmental and the other private, related to industrial production and distribution. Even the churches have built up their own strong bureaucracies in imitation of the industrial bureaucracies.

The fallacy in our thinking is our assumption that the Government bureaucracy controls the other bureaucracies and other citizens as well. We presume that the government is an umpire between the various power forces in the country. The fact of the matter is that the industrial bureaucracies have immense power, enough power to resist the power of the governmental bureaucracy and sometimes to control it substantially.

This problem has its implications for a Global World Order. If there is a global world order today, which has its own bureaucracy, this World Order bureaucracy will have to function in the context of

- (a) other powerful national government bureaucracies
- (b) the big bureaucracies of the Transnational Corporations
- (c) the cartels of parallel private bureaucracies in the nations who are organizing themselves internationally now.

It is at this point that we have to take a fresh look at the concept of dependence, independence and interdependence. The slave is dependent on the master, but the master is also dependent on the slave. In this situation however, the interdependence is based on an unjust relation in which the power is unevenly distributed. In this situation, interdependence is to be avoided, and independence is to be striven for. Inter-dependence in a relation of injustice is unjustifiable. The colonial relation is typically one of inter-dependence. The relation between the countries exporting manufactured goods and those exporting primary commodities is also one of inter-dependence, but it is not on that ground to be justified. Interdependence among unequal partners is not to be encouraged at all.

Interdependence without justice stands condemned. A world order model that puts the demands of inter-dependence before the demands of justice also for that reason stands condemned. The point is recognized by most people, but is often over-looked in some discussions.

This is precisely the issue between the developmentalists and the liberationists in the current world discussion. In Latin America, where the pattern of dependence of many economies on the North American economy is obvious, developmentalism means the ideology of the exploiter, who wants the victim of injustice to develop and produce more, in order that the exploiter can appropriate larger and larger shares of the labour of the dependent economies. The priority in such a situation is not either for development as such or for world orders of inter-dependence, but for genuine independence, and for the forgoing of healthy economic relations following liberation and independence.

But the problem is not simply between national economies. Even within each economy, there is a pattern of inter-dependence between the Government machinery and the production-distribution machinery which operates for the mutual benefit of the people who control the two machineries, but often to the detriment of the interests of the people of the nation whom the two machineries are supposed to serve.

Our situation in India is not so much in terms of the National Security strait jacket as in terms of the inter-dependence between the governmental bureaucracy and the bureaucracy of production and distribution. A small but significant part of the latter is controlled by the former. But we know that the Private-sector and its bureaucracy has a telling impact on the governmental machinery. Their mutual interdependence, which may work to the mutual benefit of the people involved in the two sub-systems, however, leaves 60% of the nation very much at a disadvantage. We have the heavy defence expenditure syndrome, with concern for balance of weapons, balance of payments, and scarcity of resources, but that does not

make "National security state" the right term to describe our situation. Our problem is that the people are powerless.

This situation can be duplicated at the world level by any premature emergence of a world order. The world order if conceived as an economic reality, has already emerged, with its own bureaucracy, committees, conferences, trade agreements, aid arrangements and all the rest of the paraphernalia of inter-dependence. The whole point of the current debate is that this economic order is unjust, and hence the cry for a *new* international economic order. The new international economic order will involve a new global arrangement for division of labour, new terms of trade, new controlling mechanisms etc.

If the "world order" that is being talked about is a political order whose intended purpose is to regulate the emerging economic order in the interests of justice, it is of course to be commended. But the risk is that the economically powerful will dominate the political world order to the extent that they may use it not only to bolster up the unjust economic order, but also to enhance the efficiency and the strength of an exploitative system. The powerless, instead of becoming empowered, may become even more powerless and helpless with the emergence of a world order. It is admitted that the global arena is today largely jungle territory, without grace or government. But simply by giving the jungle into the more ordered control of the lions and the tigers, the weaker animals may not be able to achieve any greater security.

I have already spoken about the role of government. Government is not the nation. In India we are in desperate need of realizing that the Government can solve only some of our problems. India is people. Who represents the people in a world order framework? Can we leave it to the governments alone? Especially if the governments are in league with feudal aristocracies or industrial bureaucracy? Who would make sure that the people's interests are not trampled upon or over-looked in world order parleys, in favour of the interests of one or more privileged groups in the nations? The world order that emerges must have direct participation of the people, and that is a machinery that is quite cumbersome to evolve.

(III)

My third point relates to the values in an emerging world order. A good starting point for reflection is Richard Falk's fourfold valuational system :

- V₁ — the minimization of large scale collective violence (my catch word, peace and disarmament)
- V₂ — the maximization of social and economic well-being (my catchword—human development)

- V₃ — the realization of fundamental human rights and conditions of political justice (my catch word, *rights and justice*)
- V₄ — the maintenance and rehabilitation of ecological quality. (my catch word, ecological sustainability)

Falk's book gives an additional list of values which have to do with the quality of human life and the full realization of the human potential, but he does not believe that these fall properly within the purview of Government. Falk as a classical liberal, sees the role of government as minimal, and would therefore regard the four sets of values as adequate as far as World Order Models are concerned. Falk also points out that these values come into conflict with each other. The demands of justice may come into conflict with the demands for peace and disarmament. The demands of economic well-being may come in conflict with the demands of ecological sustainability. In different situations value weightings will have to be decided on an ad hoc basis. Quite often some values will have to be sacrificed in order to protect others which seem more "valuable" in the situation.

Falk then proposes a new measuring rod for human development, different from the usual GNP criterion. It is to index these values. That is, the optimum would be 500 points for each of the 4 values, thus positing a total of 2000 on V₁ to V₄. There will be a calculus of negative and positive indicators for value achievements, and a good society is one that has come to 300 points in each of the four values. The World Order will then have to assess all the states and see how the average stands for the whole world.

This is a very practical solution in which there is much to commend. We are desperately in need of Quality of Life Indicators that are objectively ascertainable, and any help in this direction is to be welcomed. The question however, is whether these are the only four sets of values about which a government should be concerned. Prof. Falk, a confessed liberal, believes that the least Government's is the best government, and that other values like harmony, joy, creativity and freedom should be fostered non-governmentally. (*A Study of Future Worlds*, p-31)

Here is the major difficulty. Can we delineate the realm of Government effort from that of the people's effort so neatly? We are in danger of much confused thinking at this point. In India we distinguish between the Public Sector and Private Sector. What the Government does is supposedly public, and what the people do is supposedly private. But this is patently false. The relation between what the Government does and what the people do cannot be so neatly separated. Government has to be an enabler for the

people to achieve values which are commonly held by the people. Government work when alienated from the people, becomes disastrous to the nation.

Let me now speak as a Christian. From the perspective of my Christian understanding of reality, I have always to deal simultaneously with two sets of values—one set of personal and community values, and another set of political, economic and social values. The second value-set can be undergirded by State legislation, by state-controlled rewards and punishments and can be built into national planning. In this category are the four sets of values noted by Falk. These values are always provisional and change from time to time in the course of history. The personal and community values are mainly for voluntary groups; they cannot be legislated. For a Christian these values are love, joy, peace, toughness, gentleness, goodness, trustworthiness, modesty and self-restraint. Gal : -5, 22-23 lists these as the fruit-singular of the Spirit. I would add at the top of this list, from Eastern Biblical-perspective, the value of "freedom", and make it a round 10. I would add that all these values have a personal and a community dimension. Communities can be tough, gentle, good, trustworthy, self-restrained etc.

But then what is the relation between Falk's values V_1 to V_4 and this list of ten personal and community values? Can we leave all these latter things entirely to the "private sector"? I submit that such a division is hardly tenable. The value system of a society is neither an epiphenomenon to the system of production and distribution; nor can it be seen as an upper floor *constructed* on the ground floor of economic relations and not something constructed on top of the relations of production and distribution. The challenge for human social structure today is to *construct* a system of production and distribution which will *generate* and sustain the desired value-system. This means that the value-orientation has to be built into the system of production and distribution. Power and profit is one value-orientation for economic relations. Social development of the people is another value orientation. This is a basic historic choice. It seems most nations are today choosing a percentage of both together. What we in India call a "mixed economy" (unfriendly critics call it the mixed up economy) is a reality in all societies. Even those societies which strike a radically socialist pose, e.g. China or Tanzania, have at the same time to pay attention to power and profit for the nation. In fact recent changes in China point to the pressure for a more pragmatic power-and-profit-oriented line suppressing the more clearly socialistic, ideological orientation. In the Soviet union, power-and-profit incentives are used even to coax the individual peasant and factory worker. One can arrange the various nation-states

of the world on a scale of a mixture of different proportions of the two basic motivations. The main point is that value-orientation cannot be tacked on to a system of production and distribution.

But is it not true that in a basically capitalistic system, where the fundamental orientation is for power and profit, one still sees other values flourishing despite the pressure of the system? Is it not a fact that Gandhism can flourish under the umbrella of capitalism, to take one concrete example? Did not Martin Luther King spring out of a system in which the basic relations of production were power-and-profit oriented?

We need at this point to recognize again the factor of human freedom which often blossoms in the mud. A structure that is evil can thus produce good values because this human freedom frequently manifests itself best under adverse circumstances. Even a good structure can, because of this element of human freedom, give rise not only to evil values, but also to alternate values of goodness which are not fostered by the structure itself.

But we should also look at the other side of the coin. True, Gandhism flourished under capitalism. Martin Luther King flourished in the American system. But is it not also true that neither of the two movements has managed to strike roots in the society in which it arose, precisely because the socio-economic structure was inimical to its values? It is one thing to throw up an occasional Gandhi or King, and quite another to have their values more enduringly embodied in the structure of society. There may be no role at all for a Gandhi or a King in a society which is free, just, and racially integrated. One cannot judge a society by the criterion of how many great saints or moral heroes it has produced. A more dependable criterion is what happens to the awareness of ordinary people, their purposes and aspirations. It is in this sense that I insist that value-orientation has to be built into the system of production and distribution. In India we are still in a situation where we try with increasing ineffectiveness to superimpose a set of altruistic values over an economic system which engenders and promotes the values of greed and acquisitiveness.

But the problem today is a little more than the issue between socialism and capitalism. They are both systems thrown up by a post-Christian civilization in Europe, and responds more directly to European socio-economic reality. We in India have a different perspective on reality, a different heritage, a different cultural personality, different from that of European nations and even from China. Our own value orientation cannot be exactly the same as that of Western socialism or humanism.

It has to be different not because we think everything European is wrong. Rather, we are under obligation to learn everything we can from

the experience of the rest of humanity. However, our own culture embodies a different perception of what it means to be human. Our Western educated liberals often overlook this heritage, because their training has not given them an opportunity to understand and appreciate it. Our masses are still in touch with this heritage, and the Indian liberal will do well to sit at the feet of the masses and learn from them what our own true humanity is. Three values which are of cardinal importance are *Renunciation* (including the concept of *niskamakarma* and the idea of simplicity), *Unity with the cosmos*, and the *perspective that transcends time and space, Objectivity and Quality*.

The Indian contribution to the world order would include the embodiment of a value-system of this kind built into the socio-economic structure. This requires a lot of further reflection and study. We will also have to figure out more clearly how much of the value system is directly thrown up by the system of production and distribution and how much by other factors.

(IV)

The problem of world order, seen from the perspective of education in India, comes to three major thrusts :

- (a) *Class-room education i.e. textbooks, teachers, curriculum, testing etc.*
 - (b) *non-institutional education i.e. mass mobilization and education*
 - (c) *the dialectic between the two.*
- (a), *Class-room education*. In relation to this one can only indicate points at which reform is required, like
- i. examination of the teaching of world history and world culture, and correction of the bias towards Graeco-Roman, West European overemphasis bringing in more appreciation and understanding of Asian and African cultures and history ;
 - ii. relating all subjects to human problems and current human aspirations all over the world ;
 - iii. providing more opportunities to learn social cooperation and the organization of work for the common benefit, without personal profit motive.
 - iv. giving more encouragement and recognition to qualities of social cooperation, e.g. willingness to subordinate personal interest to social interest, ability to settle tensions in the community, skills of making the community mobile for undertaking common

projects etc. These qualities should be tested and marks given for these also.

- v. teacher training which includes the ability to develop social skills and to work with people in the villages ; also developing interest in world order questions like international economic justice, disarmament, aid and trade problems, resource conservation etc.

(b) *Mass mobilization and Education.* In a country like India, the educational system is defective both quantitatively and qualitatively :

- i. Half the illiterate people of our country are still unreached by programmes of literacy ;
- ii. those who have received an education are constantly grumbling about its quality.

We cannot therefore depend upon the expansion of the present educational system as the solution either to the problem of literacy or to the related problem of the powerlessness of the masses vis-a-vis the twin organized powers of governmental bureaucracy and industrial bureaucracy.

What we need is therefore an alternative system of education which supplements the present system of schools. This would be a system of mobilization of mainly rural people, but also of dispossessed urban people. It would be a programme in which the people organize themselves for thinking in literacy, skills, culture, and social cooperation for production and distribution. This is an enormous programme, and the trained manpower for this should come largely from the present educational system. The boys and girls who have finished 10 years of schooling can be sent to the villages to assist in these village development programmes, under the guidance of teachers specially trained for this work. Thus the school-system will interlock with the alternative mass-education system and will transform and reinforce each other.

The two-year pre-degree programme will relate itself to the two-year experience of working with the mass education movement, and to the human problems encountered there. University training will be given to people chosen from among pre-degree students who show aptitudes for,

- i. academic and technical work,
- ii. social engineering leadership, and
- iii. innovation and creativity in the various fields.

(c) The dialectic between the school system and the mass-organization system is bound to throw up many conflicts and hopefully also create a dynamic of social change. The world order system towards which all of this will be oriented will be one that affirms cultural dignity as well as the organization of the power of the voiceless of the world. The inability of

institutional education to meet the demands of this dialectic will itself lead to a transformation of institutional education. Real large-scale contact between our students and our rural and urban masses may turn out to be the catalyst that sets in motion a process of change with lasting results.

(V)

1. A just world order model cannot be conceived until the powerless of the world have been better organized for making their own contribution to it.
2. A world order that is truly human cannot be constructed by first creating a model and then building it up. It has to evolve from the pressures for justice and solidarity that are already operative in human society. An artificially constructed world order may become an additional tool for the powerful to oppress and exploit the underprivileged.
3. A world order model cannot be an association of Governments alone. It must devise a means of drawing into it the contributions of all segments of the public. This requires a tremendous amount of imagination and creativity.
4. A world order model will also have to devise a different way of organizing local societies for production and distribution, so as to generate, foster and sustain genuinely human values.
5. Economics and education are two key points in building a world order. Negative factors are the national security state, the world market system and the patterns of exploitation and oppression that distort human social existence everywhere. Dealing with these problems is more urgent and perhaps more important than building world order models in a situation of international injustice. Creating a dialectic between the educated elite and the illiterate or semi-literate masses may generate a social dynamic of vast proportions.

POPULATION PROBLEMS OF THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT.

A Study in Present Trends.

Introduction.

Ever since T.R.Malthus published his Essay on the Principle of Population, in 1798, if not already before that, the growing population of the world has been a matter of serious concern to many thinking people. While Malthus himself was more or less a product of his age and was perhaps at least in part influenced by a desire to rationalise and justify the status quo and hold back the forces of Liberte, Equalite and Fraternite, which were already threatening to undermine the then orthodox way of life, his theory of population has stimulated a great deal of sociological thinking in later years, especially in the twentieth century when the phenomenal growth of population and the stark poverty of such large areas of the world like India and China became more and more apparent. The Malthusian theory which has been to a large extent discredited now, held that the growth of population in any given area was correlated to the availability of the means of subsistence, and that any attempt at raising the level of living of the people of backward areas would interfere with this natural principle and thus cause serious trouble. He cited as a case in point the phenomenal growth of population in America due to its vast resources and predicted that poverty would come in as soon as the population reached a certain ceiling beyond which it could not grow. He pointed to India and China as areas where such growth of popu-

lation was not to be seen at any phenomenal pace. A good summary of this theory is given by J.A.Field¹ in the following words: "... by virtue of the undiminishing impulse and power of reproduction, population, if unrestricted, would increase in geometrical ratio and, according to the experience of the American States, would double itself as often as every twentyfive years. Subsistence, in countries where cultivation is already developed, could not increase more than in an arithmetical ratio. Thus population tends constantly to increase beyond the means of subsistence and is only restricted by preventive and positive checks, which are all resolvable into moral restraint, vice, and misery. Moral restraint is the sole means of escape from vice and misery; and any project to better society and alleviate want by means which weaken individual responsibility for the exercise of moral restraint serves only to aggravate the evils it seeks to cure."

Population trends in Western Europe and the U.S. since the days of Malthus have conclusively proved that this theory does not take into account all the possibilities in population growth.² Several new theories have now been put forth by sociologists, denying any concept of 'natural law', which according to them is the framework of the Malthusian theory. Many of these theories are of the 'Optimum' type, theories related to a certain optimum of population in

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1. Field J.A. Essays on Population, p. 1.

2. Dell and Luthringer, Population, Resources and Trade, p.35

connection with some assumed purpose or objective like military power, natural resources etc.,. The emphasis thus is shifted from on how things are bound to be, to that on how things ought to be. In this regard, the optimum theories may be said to be a real step ahead of the naturalistic theories.

If we were to adopt an economic optimum theory, that is a theory by which population should be planned to induce the best possible ratio between population and natural resources, we are likely to ignore the fact that a mere increase in the per capita income alone of a nation does not necessarily indicate the optimum welfare of that nation, since factors of distribution may tend to make the standards of living of the masses still far from desirable. It, however, cannot be attempted within the scope of this short paper to take this factor into consideration, and the assumption from the beginning will be that the goal in view is a 'decent' per capita income, except where specifically stated otherwise.

Trends in World Population.

Titles like "Rising Tide of Color"³, and "Danger Spots in World Population", often tend to give one the idea that one of the great dangers of the world ^{today} is the fact that the population of the Far East is growing by leaps and bounds while that of the rest of the world remains more or less static. A few simple statistics will quickly disprove this.

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3 Stoddard, 1921.

4. Thompson.

Estimated Population of the World and Its Distribution
By Continents - 1800-1939.

Continent	1800	1900	1939	
Population (in millions)				
World	919	1,527	2,080	
Asia	600	839	1,097	
Europe	188	390	542	
Africa	100	141	157	
N. & Cent. America	15	110	184	
S. America	14	41	89	
Oceania	2	6	11	
Percentage Distribution Increase%				
			(1800-1939)	
Asia	65.3	54.9	52.7	82.83
Europe	20.5	25.5	26.1	188.30
Africa	10.9	9.2	7.5	57.00
N. & C. America	1.6	7.2	8.8	1126.67
S. America	1.5	2.7	4.3	535.71
Oceania	.2	.4	.5	450.00

(Data from Thompson, Plenty of People, p.4)

The above table clearly indicates that the slowest growth of population has been in Asia and Africa, a fact which apparently supports Malthus' theory that population growth is directly co-ordinated to availability of means of subsistence. It also indicates the preposterous nature of the assumption that the growth of population in the underdeveloped countries of the world is abnormal and has to be checked by some means or other.

Another rather common popular assumption is that the countries of the far east are more thickly populated than the industrial nations of the west. The fallacy of this assumption can also best be indicated by some valid statistics. Except in the case of Japan, the Far East in general is seen to be much

more sparsely populated than the West.

Country	Person per sq. mile (1938 estimates)	
	For total land area.	For arable land area.
France	203	524
Germany	360	927
Italy	372	883
Great Britain	519	2421
Netherlands	704	2210
Switzerland	273	2153
Japan	506	3131
India	238	780
China	108	432

POPULATION TRENDS IN INDIA

It is in the background of the various theories of population and the above world statistics that we presume to look at the trends of population in the Indian sub-continent for the past few decades. Since the figures available are mostly for India and Pakistan together, it is necessary that the two nations be treated as a unit.

The following table gives an over-all picture of the trends during the last sixty years or so.*

Year	Population	Increase	Percentage Incr.
1881	253,896,330	47,733,970	23.2
1891	287,314,671	33,418,341	13.2
1901	294,361,056	7,046,385	2.5
1911	315,156,396	20,795,340	7.1
1921	318,942,480	3,786,084	1.2
1931	352,837,778	33,895,298	10.6
1941	388,897,955	50,878,801	15.0
Mar 1, 1950 (Est)	422,340,000	33,342,045	8.6
Total Increase 1881-1950		168,443,670	66.3

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 *These figures are taken from the India and Pakistan Yearbook of 1949 and are at considerable variance from figures quoted by Thompson and others. The 1950 estimate is taken from the Encyclopaedia Britannica Book of the Year 1951.

The first census in India was taken in 1872 and the system has been more nearly perfected in recent years only. To make too drastic conclusions on the basis of the earlier figures would hence not be wise. Even in recent years, the prevalence of epidemics like the influenza epidemic of 1918-19 and the serious crop failure that preceded and perhaps caused it in 1918, with a total estimated mortality of 12 to 13 millions have all been factors in making the fluctuations in the rate of increase so unpredictable. One has to be quite careful, therefore in predicting future trends, but it is quite reasonable to suppose that barring serious epidemics or famines, the population of India is at present increasing at the rate of 10 % every ten years. Statistics clearly indicate that the birth-rate has always remained reasonably constant, whereas the fluctuation when such there was, has always been in the death rate. The reader is warned that the official figures given below are by no means accurate, due to the fact that birth registration in India is still not very efficient.

Year	Birthrate	Deathrate	Infant Mortality
1920	33	31	195
1925	32	24	175
1930	33	25	189
1932	34	22	169
1934	34	25	187
1936	36	23	162
1938	34	24	167
1940	33	22	160

Let us now briefly consider some of the factors that influence both the birth and death rates, in order to bring

our predictions within more reasonable limits.

It is rather reasonable to suppose that owing to the absence of strictly enforced laws requiring the citizen to register all births, the official figures are likely to be rather short of actual facts, and the Indian and Pakistan Year Book estimates the birth-rate at 47 or 48 per thousand. If this is true it is one of the highest in the world, the rate in most countries being far below 40. The birth-rate in a country is usually dependent on three important factors, namely, the number of women of child-bearing age in the community, the number of such women who are married, and the age at which they marry, since the fertility rate is usually higher in the earlier half of the child-bearing period. It is seen in India that about 46.47% of the women are of child-bearing age and about 49.3% of the total number of women were recorded as married. It is also seen that in 1931 only 44 in 1000 of women between the ages 20-29 were recorded as unmarried, which indicated that the number of spinsters is very low. As regards the fertility rate, it is seen that while 80% of all women between the ages 15-45 are married, 64% of these are in the age-group 15-30 when the fertility rate is very high. Contrary to public opinion, however, the Indian woman is not very much more fecund than the English woman for example. While the average Indian woman leaves behind her about 6 children, the English woman leaves behind about 5. It is more because there are more marriageable women married

and married at a comparatively early age in India, that the birth-rate in India has become higher than that in other lands.

The present trends in India seem to indicate that early marriages are being discouraged, and with the advent of modern education, patterns in marriage are undergoing revolutionary changes, which are very likely to bring down the birth-rate during the coming decade. Birth-control also is becoming at least free from social stigma in India these days.

What about the death-rate. It is unquestionably among the highest in the world. In 1939 it was 22 in India compared to 12.3 in Germany, 15.3 in France, 12.2 in U.K. and 10.6 in the U.S. The overwhelming majority of these deaths in India are due to tropical diseases like small-pox, typhoid, dysenteries, cholera and malaria. Out of 6,165,234 deaths in 1939, 1,441,614 were caused by malaria, 260,300 by dysenteries, 97,566 by cholera and 48,103 by small-pox. Tuberculosis and nutritional diseases also take a heavy toll. High infant mortality, famines, epidemics are all major factors. Lack of sanitation and medical facilities precipitates many a death. Improvement in these is a vital factor tending to reduce the death-rate as will be seen from the following chart of death rate and I.M.R. per thousand.

Year	Deaths per 1000 population	I.M.R. per 1000 live births.
1941	21.9	158
42	21.4	163
43	23.9	165
44	24.5	169
45	22.1	151
46	18.7	136
47	19.7	146

The apparent increase during the years 43-45 can perhaps be attributed to the fact that during this period most of the available doctors and nurses were on military duty and the civilian population as seriously neglected. It is quite conceivable that when the figures for the years 1947-52 become available, it will be seen that the efforts of the new national government has significantly reduced the death-rate, especially the I.M.R. Improved sanitation, better nutrition, more production of food through irrigation and better distribution, cessation of internecine conflicts, control of epidemics by quarantine, vaccination and inoculation, are all factors that are definitely going to have a telling effect on both the death-rate and the I.M.R.

TRENDS IN RESOURCES OF INDIA

Given that the death-rate of India is going down at a faster pace than the birth-rate, the population is bound to be on the increase for several decades to come and the question poses itself: Will India be able to find adequate resources to find even a subsistence level of living ~~for~~ these millions?

India being an overwhelmingly agricultural country, with almost 70 percent of her population directly engaged in agriculture, improvement in agriculture is bound to be the most important factor that has to be considered for the immediate future. There are two areas in which improvement has been made during the last few years, first in increasing the area under cultivation and second in stepping up the acreage yield.

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In any given area one-fifth to one-sixth of the land used to lie fallow¹, but in recent years several ~~mi~~ thousands of acres have been brought under cultivation. Improved farming methods, the use of fertilizers and other factors have, in the recent years brought the acreage yield much higher above what it was in 1945. According to the present plans of the government, India, who imported Rs. 1480 million worth of grains in 1949, expects to be entirely self-sufficient in the matter of food by the year 1956.

It is only as the industrial system develops and becomes ready to absorb the man-power that will be thrown off the farms, were mechanised farming to be introduced, that the very idea of modern machinery can be introduced on a large scale in India. India, who already stands as the eighth largest industrial nation of the world is quite likely to develop a large industrial structure and regain the balance between manufacture and industry which was her very strength in the days when the European colonists came to her as traders in the relatively plenteous 17th century. When that happens it is inevitable that the extreme problems of food now being faced in India will be met with by the Indians themselves in such a way that with the rise in the level of living and standards of nutrition, a stronger and healthier India will emerge. But it seems also inevitable that as India becomes a stronger and healthier nation, and as the population keeps

1 Thompson, Population and Peace in the Pacific. p. 228

growing at the present rate, the population pressure thus created might lead India to the place where she will face the same problems as the nations of Europe did in the 16th to 20th centuries.

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Oskar Pfister Memorial Lecture, A P A, May 1992.

HOW DO WE PSYCHOANALYSE OUR SOCIETIES AND OUR RELIGIONS?

SOME NEW TASKS FOR ALL OF US

(Metropolitan Dr. Paulos Mar Gregorios, India)

Permit me first to express my profound gratitude to the American Psychiatric Association both for the honour you have done me through the Oskar Pfister Award, and for this unusual and not quite merited privilege of addressing such an impressive body of distinguished psychiatrists and other healers.

I wish also to pay my tribute to Oskar Pfister (1873-1956), the Protestant Pastor of Zurich at the beginning of this century, Theologian, Philosopher and Psychoanalyst, personal friend and reverent critic of Sigmund Freud. He wrote his *The Illusion of a Future* in respectful response to Freud's *The Future of an Illusion*. Of course Pfister's work is hardly known to any but the specialist. Unlike many Calvinist pastors of his time he not only respected psychoanalysis as a valid tool for healing humans (he was a founding member of the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society in 1910), but also trained himself in the technique and used it. He deplored the cavalier treatment of psychoanalysis by many of his pastoral and theological colleagues. He was himself an avowed liberal who opposed theological dogma. All the same his heart was big enough lovingly to accept those who found their security in clinging to dogma.

Trained in the Freudian psychoanalytic technique, he was yet quite critical of the dogmas of psychoanalysis, not only its views about religion, but also its world view borrowed from the science of his day. No wonder then that both Jung and Freud were in turn somewhat condescending or patronising in their guarded appreciation of Pastor Pfister. This is what Freud had to say about him:

"We have all grown very fond of Pfister. He is really an acceptable priest, and he has even helped me by exerting a

moderating influence on my father complex. We were like old friends in no time; he is a little fulsome in his enthusiasm, but there is nothing false or exaggerated in his warmth. Whether he will be able to preserve his residue of faith for long strikes me as doubtful; he is only at the beginning of a far reaching development, and the bad company he keeps is bound to have its effect".

(Sigmund Freud in his letter no. 142F to Carl Gustaf Jung. 16th May 1909, in Wm. McGuire, ed., Alan McGlashan, abridged, **The Freud/Jung Letters**, Picador, Pan Books, 1979, pp. 147-48)

And this is what Jung said in his letter to Freud:

"Pfister was here the day before yesterday and relayed your greetings. Pfister of course was full of you (i.e. of Freud) and of his warm reception in your family. I hope you got a good impression of him. He is, all told, a very acceptable theologian with admirable traits of character."

(Jung to Freud in letter no. 140J d 12 May 1909, *ibid*, pp.146-47)

It is also noteworthy that after Jung's break from Freud in 1914, Pfister remained a loyal Freudian. Freud claimed to be moderately upset about Pfister's enlisting Psychoanalysis in the fight against "sin" (Letter 125F in *op. cit*). Jung on the other hand found Pfister's "mixture of medicine and theology" to his liking:

"Pfister is a splendid fellow, a neurotic himself of course, though not a severe one. Nothing scares him, a redoubtable champion of our cause with a powerful intelligence".(Letter 126J).

In his later years however, Freud became more appreciative of Pfister in a less patronising fashion. Pfister was a loyal friend to Freud, especially when Freud needed friends. As Freud writes in **Civilisation and Its Discontents**(1929), apropos Pfister:

" There are certain men from whom their contemporaries do not withhold veneration, although their greatness rests on attributes and achievements which are completely foreign to the aims and ideals of the multitude...One of these exceptional men calls himself my friend in his letters to me." (**The Major Works of Sigmund Freud**,

Well, Ladies and Gentlemen, Oskar Pfister was a great synthesizer of religion and psychoanalysis, because he recognized that in both the concern was for the welfare of the human person. But I am no Oskar Pfister. I have no professional training in psychoanalysis. Nor am I a Freudian, though I recognise Freud's great contribution to our limited knowledge of ourselves. It seems doubtful whether I could even be an "acceptable theologian" for most of you. I am definitely and somewhat unashamedly 'neurotic', in the sense that my Christian religious convictions are rather deep and I cling to them. I hope, however, that your judgment of what I say here will be tinged with that same benign tolerance which Freud and Jung exhibited towards a good old liberal-religious neurotic like the Reverend Dr. Pfister.

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I wish to argue here:

- a. that psychoanalytic theory is desperately in need of revision in the framework of a more holistic understanding of the human person and of human healing;
- b. that the world view of Psychoanalysis is rather dated, being borrowed from the naive mechanism of the world view of European science in the beginning of our century;
- c. that Psychoanalysis needs to recognise that the human person is an open and not a closed system; and that it has at any given moment more factors interacting with it than we normally concede;
- d. that Psychoanalytic theory and practice should move away from the couch of the individual client, to look more deeply at the corporate institutions of our society - both national and international, inasmuch as they have such a leading role in shaping our personalities;
5. that Psychoanalysis is a secular substitute for religion and its taboo against religion has no basis in its own theory, and is in the nature of a superstition;
6. that the way we understand religion today is itself a conceptual reality which secularism has recently created, a concept which radically individualises and privatises

and thereby marginalises religion;

- g. that the banishing of religion from the public realm, especially from the state, from state education and from state-controlled medicine, constitutes an encroachment on the basic human freedoms, and leads to a distortion of the human person and to a travesty of truth;
- h. that the search for a "humanist religion", or a so-called wedding between spirituality and the secular world view, also functions within the defective paradigm of 19th century science, which cannot accommodate genuine transcendence;
- i. that Psychoanalysts have often neglected their social responsibility to unveil the hidden depths of the psyche of society, which they can do only in cooperation with others like artists, scientists, practitioners of the various world religions, philosophers, writers, sages of other cultures and countries; and
- j. that a group of creative and dedicated psychiatrists and psychoanalysts should take the initiative for setting up a project to see how all of us can together carry out this social responsibility to analyse the human condition more fully and to prescribe possible cures. I would commit myself to working with such a project if it takes shape.

1. Psychoanalytic Theory in need of Holistic Revision

Theory and experience function as the two pillars of modern science, which latter strives to be at once both rational and empirical. Theory provides the scientific hypothesis; experimental or empirical confirmation serves as validation for hypotheses in all the sciences, both physical and human.

The success of modern science-technology has not, however, been in its theory, but rather in its tangible achievements. As a result-oriented operational method, it managed to eclipse religion in the 18th and 19th centuries by the sheer mass and variety of its demonstrable and repeatable achievements in many fields like health, agriculture, engineering, manufacturing, communication, transportation, war and space exploration.

Science now functions more or less in the same role in western civilisation, as the religion of the Roman Catholic Church once did in medieval Europe. The priest in his black cassock, with cross in hand, was soon replaced by the scientist in his white laboratory smock, and in more recent times, standing or sitting before a computer. If in medieval Christendom the adage was "Roma locuta est, causa finita est" (Rome has spoken; the matter is settled), till yesterday the position was "Scientia locuta est, causa finita est" (Science has spoken; the matter is settled).

I say, till yesterday, because today perceptive scientists and philosophers of science would claim no final status for any scientific hypothesis, even when it is operationally successful. All scientific theory is provisional and keeps changing very fast, as a cursory perusal of scientific texts of 30 years ago can easily show us. This is so because all scientific theory is necessarily inductive, that is, inferences based on a limited number of experiences, subject to possible revision in the light of new data or new experience.

Scientific knowledge is cumulative, but at no stage definitely or necessarily conclusive. Occasionally a new scientific paradigm revolution occurs, wiping out the very structure of previous scientific theory. Scientific theory is thus not proved, but provisional and only operationally valid.

Neither is scientific theory objective. In fact all theory is a subjective creation, not something supplied by objective reality. Of course it is suggested by previous experience; but it is only reflection, conjecture, creative speculation, human verbal-pictorial-mathematical formulation, and not the 'objective' experience itself which supplies scientific theory. Objectivity in science means only proposing some normative standards agreed upon by the scientific community for checking the validity of the theory and the experiment as well as their relation to each other.

Psychoanalytic theory has come into being in the context of modern science-technology and is fully subject to the limitations of the latter. The sciences related to medicine, particularly anatomy and physiology, had a powerful role in the development of European materialism and mechanism which form the basic paradigm of Newtonian science-technology - a world of material objects, spread out in space, causally

connected and mechanically moved. The reluctance to abandon this mechanistic paradigm even in Quantum physics (for example, the Copenhagen Interpretation of the collapse of the wave function as description of what happens in the measurement of a supposed phenomenon in the quantal realm) is simply another instance of the mechanistic-reductionistic dogmatism built into modern science.

Psychoanalytic theory came to birth in that kind of a milieu. Freud had learned deeply from the medical doctor Ludwig Buechner's **Kraft und Stoff** (Force and Matter), which was published in 1855 and became for many in the European Enlightenment the Bible of the new Natural Scientific materialism and mechanism of the second half of the 19th century, particularly in Germany. Freud, like Marx and Engels earlier, accepted the prevailing view of the universe as a self-contained system in which matter and force (or energy) were the only operative entities.

Freud's **Weltanschauung** (world-view or basic paradigm of reality) was what the Marxists had later labelled "Vulgar Materialism" - the undialectical and ahistorical materialism of Vogt, Buechner and Moleschott. Both dialectical-historical materialists and vulgar materialists, however, agreed that matter and force (energy, motion) were constantly acting and reacting against each other, some forces being counter-reacted, deflected, obstructed or repressed by others. Everything that happens in the universe could be explained in terms of these acting and counteracting forces. The question whether the universe was a closed system or an open system had not been raised in those terms at that time. What had been acknowledged was the Law of Conservation of Energy, that the total energy in the universe was a constant. The unarticulated implication, of course, was that the universe was a self-sufficient closed system.

Freud conceived the human person also as a self-contained system, more or less on the analogy of the closed universe. He was simply accepting without question the burgeoning bourgeois ideology of the European Enlightenment. As he stated at the end of the last lecture in his **New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis**:

"Psychoanalysis is not, in my opinion, in a position to create a **Weltanschauung** of its own. It has no need to do so, for it is a branch of science, and can subscribe to the scientific **Weltanschauung**. The latter, however, hardly merits such a high-sounding name, for it does not take

everything into its scope, it is incomplete, and it makes no claim to being comprehensive or to constituting a system. Scientific thought is still in its infancy; there are very many of the great problems with which it has as yet been unable to cope."

2. The Human Person as No Closed System

Clearly Freud was not out to build a system, but to construct enough theory to provide an operational technique. He took many things for granted from the infant science of his day. In doing so, he however made assumptions which we need to question today - primarily about the human person conceived as an individual, as a self-contained system with its own drives and instincts, cathexes and repressions, complexes and dreams, a mind that is conscious, preconscious and unconscious, a personality composed of id, ego and super-ego, and inbuilt mechanisms like pleasure principle and reality principle, life instinct and death instinct and so on .

We are under pressure today to acknowledge the obvious fact that the individual is not a self-contained system, but an open system within a complex of larger and more inclusive systems like the family, the workplace, the society, the nation, the ethnos, the region, the global human community, plants and animals and other biota, sun and moon, earth and sky, and the galactic system of the universe itself.

Today we are in a context where psychoanalysis has to play down its claims to being a scientific theory, and to conceive of itself in more hermeneutic rather than strictly scientific terms. It is perhaps something midway between art and science, but more scientific in the sense of being more methodical, than say, literature or poetry. It is hermeneutic in the sense that it is a continuing dialogue between the therapist and the patient, within a relationship of discovery or unveiling in which the subjective characteristics of both partners play a large role.

But the major paradigm shift demanded today is to go beyond the one to one therapist-patient relationship, to the larger perimeters within which the human person lives and operates. Psychoanalysis, it seems to me, will have to see the person as one on whom a variety of forces constantly impinge and for whom many things are decided by others. The

person does not exist in isolation from or independent of these forces, and therapy has to take full account of these forces.

The prevailing cult of success forces one's basic life orientation into a stress-increasing pursuit of manifest achievement. The international industrial, commercial, banking and finance system controls what one gets out of one's labour, and determines how much one has to pay as part of the debt one's nation owes to these finance establishments. One feels helpless about the international and national military politics. The system of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction, not within one's control, tower over one all through life, menacingly.

The worship of power, the lust for lucre, and the cult of pleasurable experience (good times) and of instant gratification put undue strains on one's self-esteem. The wild and mindless terror and violence that stalk our streets and haunt our homes curtail a person's liberty to act and impose the stress of insecurity on the family and person. The systems of cultural dictatorship and economic exploitation, of male domination and female protest, the obligation to pay bills and taxes, the stress of responsibility to meet family needs and settle debts, the pressure to conform to the values and standards set by an urban-industrial-technological-commercial-military-pseudo-academic society that makes little sense and pays even less attention to the person - all these are directly related to human psychopathology.

Past history and present situation of the nation and the globe affect the person in society; the guilt of war and destruction dealt by one's nation to other peoples weigh heavily on the conscience of some people, both consciously and unconsciously; we suspect we have a share in causing the suffering of people, and especially of women and children, through an unjust system of exploitation and misuse of resources; often unexpressed and unacknowledged our guilt continues to prick our unconscious - guilt about the suffering of other people due to geological and climatic changes, cyclones and earthquakes, floods and landslides, deforestation and desertification. And now the guilt of having fouled our nest by gross ecological irresponsibility simply helps to make the total burden simply unbearable. The male of the species is now being made to bear another guilt - that of dominating and marginalising the female of the species. The female of the species in turn feels under

pressure to express her protest through means prescribed by others.

Psychoanalysis and psychiatry as well as all the healing sciences in general need to take a new look at what it means to be human today. Obviously it will have to extend the concept of the Person to include all humanity's relation - to each other, to an unjust society and to the polluted environment, as well as to the Transcendent from which one is alienated, as constitutive elements in the conception of the human person.

3. Psychoanalysing the Institutions of Society

By society one does not mean just one to one or person to person relationships, but also the whole gamut of the institutions of society that sustain, nurture and shape that relationship. We will need help from psychoanalysts and psychiatrists as well as from other scientists, artists, writers, philosophers and others to analyse in depth the pattern of our involvement in these institutions and to help release some of our social repressions about these faceless institutions into the people's general conscious awareness.

We must see how we ourselves have been responsible not only for the creation of all sorts of distortions in these social institutions; but we must also accept collective responsibility for actually repressing in the people's consciousness the conscious awareness of the anti-human characteristics of institutions related to the state, bureaucracy, media, information, science-technology, international finance, trade, commerce, industry and so on. Our social unconscious is teeming with distressing perceptions deeply repressed, social guilt driven deep into the social unconscious.

This means that neither the religious worker nor the psychotherapist nor any other healer needs to wait for the patient to approach him or her. The pathology is there in society, waiting to be healed by the concerted efforts of healers of many hues. The technique of psychoanalysis will have to be applied to help us see who holds power over us and hides behind some facade, who, often without our knowing, keeps us in thralldom and ignorance, who constantly feeds lies to us, who distorts our perceptions in order to exploit us, who benefits by hurting us.

Of course such a proposal for politicisation of psycho-analysis and psychiatry - for that is what the psycho-analysis of the social entity involves - must sound abhorrent to some of you. It can indeed be a costly exercise.

If we are talking about dispelling illusions and opening ourselves to reality as the main task of the discipline of psychoanalysis, then the technique must be applied also to society, not just to the person who seeks therapeutic help. One cannot escape the politicisation of psychoanalysis, nor run away from psychoanalysis of the societal institutions of political economy, statecraft, economic production, academic formation, culture and entertainment, sports, war, and even the Leviathan of science-technology itself. In seeking to retain the pristine purity of one's profession by being apolitical, one is actually helping to perpetuate illusions in the consciousness of the people.

4. The Human Person We see today - The Need for a Fresh conceptual frame

The human person which Freud saw and analyzed in the Vienna ghettos of the first decades of this century bears little resemblance to the human person we encounter today in the last decades of the same century in the global jungle of our "smokestack civilisation" as Alvin Toffler calls it. And psychoanalytic theory as well as organized religion cries out for a new paradigm for coping with the ailments and afflictions of this latter human person and society. Religious masters and psychoanalysts have to cooperate with others in diagnosing and applying therapy to society as a whole. For this we need a fresh conceptual framework for the person in society and in the environment, and in relation to the Transcendent.

For that purpose two things need to be done. First, psychoanalysis must recognise the fact that it carries with it the handicaps of the time in which its theory was born: too individualistic and too scientific and therefore too mechanistic and reductionistic. Second, psychoanalysts will have to revise their view of religion in order to prepare themselves for genuine dialogue with informed and authentic religious masters; and the latter will have to learn to look at psycho-analysis not patronisingly but with real informed

understanding.

A new perception of the person will have to go beyond the narrow confines of psychoanalytic and psychiatric theory as it has developed so far. It will have to take into account all that we have come to know about the human person in the various endeavours, not necessarily all academic, of human life. For this religion must also be psychoanalysed and undergo therapy, before it can fruitfully join the dialogue. There is a lot of homework cut out for the leaders of religions here.

5. Psychoanalysis, Religion and the Secular

Let us not kid ourselves. Psychoanalysis is a substitute for religion created by the secular civilisation of the 19th and 20th centuries. It functions today as a religion-substitute, within the framework of a secular world view which is outdated and dangerously unscientific. It has its own dogmas (nowadays, like in religion, hardly affirmed or stated), its own priesthood, and its special discipline.

Oskar Pfister was basically right when he wrote to Freud that his "substitute for religion", i.e. psychoanalysis was "basically the idea of the eighteenth century Enlightenment in proud modern disguise". [**Psychoanalysis and Faith**, op. cit., pp 114-115.]

In any case in his later years Freud had to acknowledge, in his letter to Oskar Pfister on **The Future of an Illusion**, that his view of religion was not part of the psychoanalytic theory:

"Let us be quite clear on the point that the views expressed in my book (i.e. **The Future of an Illusion**, PG) form no part of analytic theory. They are my personal views, which coincide with those of many non-analysts and pre-analysts, but there are certainly many excellent analysts who do not share them"

Perhaps George Steiner was more to the point in his view that Psychoanalysis "provides a secular, though heavily mythological surrogate for an entire range of introspective and elucidatory disciplines extending from private meditation to the metaprivacies of the Confessional". ["A Note on Language and Psychoanalysis" in **International Review of**

Sudhir Kakar, the Indian Psychoanalyst, goes even further in seeing in Psychoanalysis "the secular Western counterpart to (Hindu) Tantra", with a most elaborate theory of Karma, i.e. theory of the decisive influence of the past upon the present, shortened into one single life-time, and even a secular form of the **guru-sishya** or teacher-disciple relationship in the modern technique of a semi-rational associative meditation (the couch) which the **guru** uses to achieve the inner transformation of the disciple. [The Analyst and the Mystic -Psychoanalytic Reflection on Religion and Mysticism, Viking, Penguin Books, 1991]

Meanwhile Freud was perhaps justified in his desire to protect psychoanalysis from the priests and entrust it to "a profession that does not exist yet, a profession of secular ministers of soul who do not have to be physicians and must not be priests." [ibid. p. 126].

Well, many of you are physicians and some of you are even priests and pastors of religious communities. Medicine, Psychoanalysis and Religion - the three have come together here. Can we do some thinking together, about how we can work as teams dedicated to the good of all? Let us suggest three things we can do together, if not here, perhaps in the future:

- a. a psychosocial analysis of religion as a historical phenomenon as well as a contemporary reality;
- b. a well informed analysis of the assumptions behind the scientific secular civilisation, which seems to imprison us in its narrow world; and a critique of the largely unexamined assumptions about healing of body and mind inherent in that civilisation;
- c. outline the basic contours of and orientations for a professional medical training system or a holistic health education programme which can cope with some of these problems.

6. What is Religion?

Freud regretted that he had ignored "the rarer and more profound type of religious emotion as experienced by mystics and saints", as Ernest Jones tells us in his three-

volume biography of the Founder of Psychoanalysis. Romain Rolland had mediated to Freud the religious experience of the Indian Hindu saint Ramakrishna - an oceanic experience of the mystery of the infinite. [See Irving B Harrison, "On Freud's View of the Infant-Mother Relationship and the Oceanic Feeling - Some Subjective Influences" in the **Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association**, 27(1979) 399-421].

It is this "oceanic feeling" which Freud tried to interpret as a regression to the limitless primary narcissism of the infant at its mother's breast, an attempt to recapture the total security of the unbreathing infant floating in the limitless ocean of the amniotic fluid in the mother's womb.

Gregory Zilboorg[**Freud and Religion, A Restatement**, London, Chapman, 1958] may have had a point in arguing that Freud's vehement denouncements of religion revealed his own repressed religious convictions, which Freud failed to resolve and had to struggle with all his life. Harrison, in the article cited above, seeks to relate Freud's personal religious conflict, his treatment of religion and the birth of psychoanalysis; obviously Freud consciously and unconsciously resisted the temptation to accept the validity of the mystical vision of total bliss, the "oceanic" peace of the womb.

Several attempts have been made in the history of western thought to touch up Freud's concept of religion and to make it respectable. I can mention, for example, Eric Fromm's distinction between "authoritarian religion" and "humanist religion", which latter recognises the psychologically integrative function of religion. Abraham Kaplan tried to distinguish between infantile, dependent religion, and mature, responsible religion. Paul Ricoeur tried to distinguish between "infantile and idolatrous consolation" and a "consolation according to spirit", free of narcissism and self-seeking. Peter Homans sought to distinguish a "non-pathological religion of transcendence" from dependence on a "transference God". Erik Erikson and Jacob Arlow sought to see religion positively as adaptation and not as neurosis resolution, even myths providing an opportunity for the ego to gain mastery of its conflicts through a healing identification with the central figures of the myth.

I have no quarrel with these noble efforts to redeem religion by distinguishing between good religion and bad religion. Freud probably made the mistake of not making that distinction at all, condemning it all as bad, as Marx

and Engels did two generations or three earlier.

My quarrel is with the very notion of religion as it now stands in our secular civilisation and in its radically altered vocabulary. Before the 17th century, the word 'religious' meant "belonging to a monastic community"; and the word "secular" meant its opposite, i.e. not belonging to a monastic community. [for a more detailed treatment of the meaning of these words see my forthcoming **A Light Too Bright**, expected to come out of the SUNY press around this time]

The word 'religion' in the sense in which we use it is largely a creation of the European Enlightenment; it is the same European Enlightenment of the 18th and 19th centuries which gave the words 'secular', 'secularisation' and 'secularism' their current meaning. The very concepts are creations of the new bourgeois industrial civilisation of 18th century Europe. Europe was unique in making this conscious and bold transition, from a society controlled by the church, to a civilisation repudiating all religious authority and seeking to banish religion altogether from the public realm. [Kemal Ataturk's Turkey tried in our century to imitate Europe at this point, but with doubtful results]

To banish religion from the public realm, i.e. from the State, from the education system, and from the healing system, both the latter being more or less imposed by the state on the people, religion becomes 'privatised', i.e. relegated to the margin of personal choices. In that process Society in the public domain made a fateful choice, namely to accept some form of secularism as its religion. Max Weber spoke about the 'desacralisation' of society; it was in fact the imposition of an unscientific atheism on society.

Religion in human history had never been private, a matter of just personal preference. Religion was always something held and practised by a community, though there could sometimes be dissenters. It was always part of a community's self-understanding and its identity; that community may be local, national, regional or worldwide.

We are now living in a civilisation which has some form of secularism for its own religion, while supposedly permitting individuals and groups to follow privately the religion of their preference. In reality, however, all religions and all denominations of religion are group or community affairs, existing today in uneasy tension with the secularist assumptions of State, education and health. In

that process religion undergoes some basic distortions like privatisation and marginalisation, which are essentially contrary to the very notion and reality of religion.

Psychoanalysis too has become a privatised religion, whose services you can get on payment if you can afford it. It fits in with the secular assumptions of the Enlightenment civilisation and with its mechanical, closed-system world view. It fills the needs of some in the middle classes, and is therefore very much in the market. It will probably go

on even if it does not radically reform itself, like the other religions going on.

7. To Conclude

My distinguished friend and colleague, Fr. Hans Kueng, in an Oscar Pfister lecture six years ago entitled "Religion - The Final Taboo", made a strong plea that Psychoanalysis should shed that Taboo against religion and adopt "a therapy that takes the phenomenon of religion seriously - as one of the specifically human forms of expression", especially the patient's "heart religion". He even offered some criteria "for distinguishing critically between true and false religiousness". One can only quite heartily endorse that plea, though with some significant qualifications.

My point is slightly different. I am not talking only about the personal or heart religion of the individual to be used in psychotherapy. My plea is to practitioners of psychotherapy that they join with others concerned, to reconsider the decision made centuries ago to banish religion from our public life. I recognise the freedom and liberty of the ideology of secularism as a particular religion, but I cannot accept its being imposed on the scientific community, on the academic community and on the healing community.

My desire is that perceptive practitioners of psychotherapy would get together with sensitive practitioners (not the official leadership) of good religion, and with sociological, political, philosophical and other workers committed to truth and to the welfare of humanity, to examine the roots of the sociopathology of our modern civilisation itself. Religion is not primarily a private affair. It is the undergirding structure of every civilisation, even our

European Enlightenment civilisation which claims to be free of all religion. Something is rotten in that undergirding structure of this present civilisation. And a good deal of that rottenness comes from this irrational phobia of religion and from the unacceptable imposing of this pseudo-religion of secularism on the culture.

Certainly organised religion has a lot of sins to confess. It has itself been responsible in large part for the reaction against religion which had set in centuries ago. There is no doubt that the structures of organised religion in our time carry an unsupportable burden of rottenness. But the answer to that is not to banish religion to the margin, and to leave it there as a matter of no public importance.

Hans Kueng suggested that true humaneness is the hallmark of true religion. And in the concept of **humanum** he includes respect for human values, human rights and human dignity. That reminds me of Eric Fromm's distinction between humanist religion and authoritarian religion. Fromm would say that the aim of humanist religion is fullest self-realisation and the achievement of great internal strength. Clearly Fromm is not only within the individualist framework, but also within the liberal humanist conceptual structure.

The liberal concept of **humanum** will hardly do as a litmus test for the religion that humanity should pursue. Not only is the concept of **humanum** in danger of leaving out the extra-human part of the created order from the consideration, but it also says nothing about the necessarily transcendent dimension of human existence, the source from which the order of reality is sustained and nourished and norms set for it.

When Protagoras first said that Man is the measure of all things, he was not laying down a law, but describing a common practice. Man, or the Human cannot be a measure for other things, both because the things that matter cannot be measured and because the **humanum** itself is no definite measurable entity; there are no ultimate limits to be imposed on the **humanum** since it is, for me as an eastern Christian, the visible image in Christ of the invisible God, and therefore sharing in the infinite character of God.

In fact I believe Liberal Humanism, which tends to absolutize the human, is more the problem than the solution when it comes to reinstating religion at the centre of life. It too has now become a religion-substitute for many in our culture.

The central issue is to have a dialectical view of the human: on the one hand the human species - both each member of the species, and the many levels of community in the species - should be free and untrammelled by any arbitrary authority imposed upon it from the outside; on the other hand it must not think of itself as finally and fully sovereign, but as responsible to its source, responsible for each other and for the whole created order, disciplined both as persons and as communities, subject to the dynamic and never fully understood Norms of God - the good, the true and the beautiful, the kind, the loving, and the gracious, the humble, the forgiving, and the life-giving and self-giving, the sacrificing and the worshipping. Liberal humanism does not deal with many of these. .

But no view of the human would be adequate if its inbuilt orientation to the transcendent is stifled or ignored. This orientation should be in society itself, not just in individuals, though individuals would always be free to try their own non-transcendent religion. The Transcendent at the foundation and source-springs of society, at its **every telos** or provisional goal, and at its final goal, all the way from the beginning to the end of human corporate existence - that is what we need to recover.

I shall not go on to describe what I mean by the Transcendent, both because the Transcendent cannot be caught in words, and because any explanation I give will necessarily be coloured by my own personal religious background. But it is there. I have experienced it, not only in my own life, but also in the lives of persons of different religions, in communities of the various religions of the world.

It is in that Transcendent that we find our own true being, the being of others as well as the being of all, whether of life or non-life, organic or inorganic, part or whole. It is in that Transcendent that human beings together find the healing that psychiatrist and patient alike yearn for. Transcendence experienced in the person's heart; but Transcendence at the heart of the community, Transcendence at the heart of history; Transcendence at the foundation and at the heart of civilisation; Transcendence that goes beyond the ego and the world, in order to bring ego and world back into proper perspective and relation with the All. That is the healing Transcendence of which I speak, and which I yearn for all.

The so-called "oceanic feeling", which Freud found so difficult to come to terms with, can only be an aspect of the experience of the Transcendent. Its ego-and-world boundary-breaking power is also another aspect of the same. But it is not because of its conflict-resolution power that we espouse the Transcendent; its value is in itself, and not as the panacea or pharmakopion for life's ills. It is not ancillary to something else; it helps everything else make sense, but "making sense" is not the final goal for which the experience of the Transcendent is a means.

Only when the ego lets go of its striving to make sense and to control, does the Transcendent break through. It breaks through where there is both personal and communal catharsis and active waiting. The psychiatrist or the religious master needs it just as much as the client or the patient or the seeker. The healer has to live by it as the healed.

Hence my final plea: give some thought to a new project called perhaps: Psychoanalysts and Others United for the Healing of Humanity. If religious masters have today to become real healers of humanity, they cannot do it on their own. No one religion has all the competence needed for this. We need all the knowledge and skills developed in history by other groups and persons. Whether formally religious or not, we must all cooperate in this project for the healing of humanity. It is not to be left to one particular profession, nor should it become the means of earning a livelihood for a small class of people. The professional and the religious master can be members of the group that together runs the project.

The European Enlightenment was a bit premature in making the rather preposterous claim more than two hundred years ago that European bourgeois humanity had already attained adulthood. True adulthood is still way in the future, both for Europeans and for non-Europeans. The project I propose may eventually and with God's grace set us on the road that leads to that adulthood for all humanity and not just for western humanity.

Oskar Pfister Memorial Lecture, A P A, 1992.

CAN WE PSYCHOANALYSE OUR SOCIETIES AND OUR RELIGIONS?

SOME NEW TASKS FOR ALL OF US

(Metropolitan Dr. Paulos Mar Gregorios, India)

Permit me first to express my profound gratitude to the American Psychiatric Association both for the honour you have done me through the Oskar Pfister Award, and for this unusual and not quite merited privilege of addressing such an impressive body of distinguished psychiatrists and other healers.

I wish also to pay my tribute to Oskar Pfister (1873-1956), the Protestant Pastor of Zurich at the beginning of this century, Theologian, Philosopher and Psychoanalyst, personal friend and reverent critic of Sigmund Freud. He wrote his **The Illusion of a Future** in respectful response to Freud's **The Future of an Illusion**. Of course Pfister's work is hardly known to any but the specialist. Unlike many Calvinist pastors of his time he not only respected psychoanalysis as a valid tool for healing humans (he was a founding member of the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society in 1910), but also trained himself in the technique and used it. He deplored the cavalier treatment of psychoanalysis by many of his pastoral and theological colleagues. He was himself an avowed liberal who opposed theological dogma. All the same his heart was big enough lovingly to accept those who found their security in clinging to dogma.

in the way
Trained in the Freudian psychoanalytic technique, he was ~~not~~ ^{nevertheless} quite critical of the dogmas of psychoanalysis, not only its views about religion, but also its world view borrowed from the science of his day. No wonder then that both Jung and Freud were in turn somewhat condescending or patronising in their guarded appreciation of Pastor Pfister. This is what Freud had to say about him:

"We have all grown very fond of Pfister. He is really an acceptable priest, and he has even helped me by exerting a

moderating influence on my father complex. We were like old friends in no time; he is a little fulsome in his enthusiasm, but there is nothing false or exaggerated in his warmth. Whether he will be able to preserve his residue of faith for long strikes me as doubtful; he is only at the beginning of a far reaching development, and the bad company he keeps is bound to have its effect".

(Sigmund Freud in his letter no. 142F to Carl Gustaf Jung. 16th May 1909, in Wm. McGuire, ed., Alan McGlashan, abridged, **The Freud/Jung Letters**, Picador, Pan Books, 1979, pp. 147-48)

And this is what Jung said in his letter to Freud:

"Pfister was here the day before yesterday and relayed your greetings. Pfister of course was full of you (i.e. of Freud) and of his warm reception in your family. I hope you got a good impression of him. He is, all told, a very acceptable theologian with admirable traits of character."

(Jung to Freud in letter no. 140J d 12 May 1909, *ibid*, pp.146-47)

It is also noteworthy that after Jung's break from Freud in 1914, Pfister remained a loyal Freudian. Freud claimed to be moderately upset about Pfister's enlisting Psychoanalysis in the fight against "sin" (Letter 125F in *op. cit*). Jung on the other hand found Pfister's "mixture of medicine and theology" to his liking:

"Pfister is a splendid fellow, a neurotic himself of course, though not a severe one. Nothing scares him, a redoubtable champion of our cause with a powerful intelligence".(Letter 126J).

In his later years however, Freud became more appreciative of Pfister in a less patronising fashion. Pfister was a loyal friend to Freud, especially when Freud needed friends. As Freud writes in **Civilisation and Its Discontents(1929)**, apropos Pfister:

" There are certain men from whom their contemporaries do not withhold veneration, although their greatness rests on attributes and achievements which are completely foreign to the aims and ideals of the multitude...One of these exceptional men calls himself my friend in his letters to me." (**The Major Works of Sigmund Freud**,

Encycl. Brit., Chicago et alibi, 1952, p. 767)

Oskar Pfister was a great Synthesizer of Religion & Psychology

Well, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am no Oskar Pfister. I have no professional training in psychoanalysis. Nor am I a Freudian, though I recognise Freud's contribution to our knowledge of ourselves. It seems doubtful that I would be an "acceptable theologian" for most of you. I am definitely and somewhat unashamedly 'neurotic', in the sense that my Christian religious convictions are rather deep and I cling to them. I hope, however, that your judgment of what I say will be tinged with the same benign tolerance that Freud and Jung exhibited towards a good old religious neurotic like Pfister.

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1. Psychoanalytic Theory in need of Holistic Revision

Theory and experience function as the two pillars of modern science, which latter strives to be at once both rational and empirical. Theory provides the scientific hypothesis; experimental or empirical confirmation serves as validation for hypotheses in all the sciences, both physical and human.

The success of modern science-technology has not, however, been in its theory, but rather in its tangible achievements. As a result-oriented operational method, it managed to eclipse religion in the 18th and 19th centuries by the sheer mass and variety of its demonstrable and repeatable achievements in many fields like health, agriculture, engineering, manufacturing, communication, transportation, war and space exploration.

Science now functions more or less in the same role in western civilisation, as the religion of the Roman Catholic Church once did in medieval Europe. The priest in his black cassock, with cross in hand, was soon replaced by the scientist in his white laboratory smock, and in more recent times, standing or sitting before a computer. If in medieval Christendom the adage was "Roma locuta est, causa finita est" (Rome has spoken; the matter is settled), till yesterday the position was "Scientia locuta est, causa finita est" (Science has spoken; the matter is settled).

I say, till yesterday, because today perceptive

scientists and philosophers of science would claim no final status for any scientific hypothesis, even when it is operationally successful. All scientific theory is provisional and keeps changing very fast, as a cursory perusal of scientific texts of 30 years ago can easily show us. This is so because all scientific theory is necessarily inductive, that is, inferences based on a limited number of experiences, subject to possible revision in the light of new data or new experience.

Scientific knowledge is cumulative, but at no stage definitely or necessarily conclusive. Occasionally a new scientific paradigm revolution occurs, wiping out the very structure of previous scientific theory. Scientific theory is thus not proved, but provisional and only operationally valid.

Neither is scientific theory objective. In fact all theory is a subjective creation, not something supplied by objective reality. Of course it is suggested by previous experience; but it is only reflection, conjecture, creative speculation, human verbal-pictorial-mathematical formulation, and not the 'objective' experience itself which supplies scientific theory. Objectivity in science means only proposing some normative standards agreed upon by the scientific community for checking the validity of the theory and the experiment as well as their relation to each other.

Psychoanalytic theory has come into being in the context of modern science-technology and is fully subject to the limitations of the latter. The sciences related to medicine, particularly anatomy and physiology, had a powerful role in the development of European materialism and mechanism which form the basic paradigm of Newtonian science-technology - a world of material objects, spread out in space, causally connected and mechanically moved. The reluctance to abandon this mechanistic paradigm even in Quantum physics (for example, the Copenhagen Interpretation of the collapse of the wave function as description of what happens in the measurement of a supposed phenomenon in the quantal realm) is simply another instance of the mechanistic-reductionistic dogmatism built into modern science.

Psychoanalytic theory came to birth in that kind of a milieu. Freud had learned deeply from the medical doctor Ludwig Buechner's **Kraft und Stoff** (Force and Matter), which was published in 1855 and became for many in the European Enlightenment the Bible of the new Natural Scientific

materialism and mechanism of the second half of the 19th century, particularly in Germany. Freud, like Marx and Engels earlier, accepted the prevailing view of the universe as a self-contained system in which matter and force (or energy) were the only operative entities.

Freud's **Weltanschauung** (world-view or basic paradigm of reality) was what the Marxists had later labelled "Vulgar Materialism" - the undialectical and ahistorical materialism of Vogt, Buechner and Moleschott. Both dialectical-historical materialists and vulgar materialists, however, agreed that matter and force (energy, motion) were constantly acting and reacting against each other, some forces being counter-reacted, deflected, obstructed or repressed by others. Everything that happens in the universe could be explained in terms of these acting and counteracting forces. The question whether the universe was a closed system or an open system had not been raised in those terms at that time. What had been acknowledged was the Law of Conservation of Energy, that the total energy in the universe was a constant. The unarticulated implication, of course, was that the universe was a self-sufficient closed system.

Freud conceived the human person also as a self-contained system, more or less on the analogy of the closed universe. He was simply accepting without question the burgeoning bourgeois ideology of the European Enlightenment. As he stated at the end of the last lecture in his **New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis**:

"Psychoanalysis is not, in my opinion, in a position to create a **Weltanschauung** of its own. It has no need to do so, for it is a branch of science, and can subscribe to the scientific **Weltanschauung**. The latter, however, hardly merits such a high-sounding name, for it does not take everything into its scope, it is incomplete, and it makes no claim to being comprehensive or to constituting a system. Scientific thought is still in its infancy; there are very many of the great problems with which it has as yet been unable to cope."

2. The Human Person as No Closed System

Clearly Freud was not out to build a system, but to construct enough theory to provide an operational technique. He took many things for granted from the infant science of

his day. In doing so, he however made assumptions which we need to question today - primarily about the human person conceived as an individual, as a self-contained system with its own drives and instincts, cathexes and repressions, complexes and dreams, a mind that is conscious, preconscious and unconscious, a personality composed of id, ego and super-ego, and inbuilt mechanisms like pleasure principle and reality principle, life instinct and death instinct and so on .

We are under pressure today to acknowledge the obvious fact that the individual is not a self-contained system, but an open system within a complex of larger and more inclusive systems like the family, the workplace, the society, the nation, the ethnos, the region, the global human community, plants and animals and other biota, sun and moon, earth and sky, and the galactic system of the universe itself.

Today we are in a context where psychoanalysis has to play down its claims to being a scientific theory, and to conceive of itself in more hermeneutic rather than strictly scientific terms. It is perhaps something midway between art and science, but more scientific in the sense of being more methodical, than say, literature or poetry. It is hermeneutic in the sense that it is a continuing dialogue between the therapist and the patient, within a relationship of discovery or unveiling in which the subjective characteristics of both partners play a large role.

But the major paradigm shift demanded today is to go beyond the one to one therapist-patient relationship, to the larger perimeters within which the human person lives and operates. Psychoanalysis, it seems to me, will have to see the person as one on whom a variety of forces constantly impinge and for whom many things are decided by others. The person does not exist in isolation from or independent of these forces, and therapy has to take full account of these forces.

The prevailing cult of success forces one's basic life orientation into a stress-increasing pursuit of manifest achievement. The international industrial, commercial, banking and finance system controls what one gets out of one's labour, and determines how much one has to pay as part of the debt one's nation owes to these finance establishments. One feels helpless about the international and national military politics. The system of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction, not

within one's control, tower over one all through life, menacingly.

The worship of power, the lust for lucre, and the cult of pleasurable experience (good times) and of instant gratification put undue strains on one's self-esteem. The wild and mindless terror and violence that stalk our streets and haunt our homes curtail a person's liberty to act and impose the stress of insecurity on the family and person. The systems of cultural dictatorship and economic exploitation, of male domination and female protest, the obligation to pay bills and taxes, the stress of responsibility to meet family needs and settle debts, the pressure to conform to the values and standards set by an urban-industrial-technological-commercial-military-pseudo-academic society that makes little sense and pays even less attention to the person - all these are directly related to human psychopathology.

Past history and present situation of the nation and the globe affect the person in society; the guilt of war and destruction dealt by one's nation to other peoples weigh heavily on the conscience of some people, both consciously and unconsciously; we suspect we have a share in causing the suffering of people, and especially of women and children, through an unjust system of exploitation and misuse of resources; often unexpressed and unacknowledged our guilt continues to prick our unconscious - guilt about the suffering of other people due to geological and climatic changes, cyclones and earthquakes, floods and landslides, deforestation and desertification. And now the guilt of having fouled our nest by gross ecological irresponsibility simply helps to make the total burden simply unbearable. The male of the species is now being made to bear another guilt - that of dominating and marginalising the female of the species. The female of the species in turn feels under pressure to express her protest through means prescribed by others.

Psychoanalysis and psychiatry as well as all the healing sciences in general need to take a new look at what it means to be human today. Obviously it will have to extend the concept of the Person to include all humanity's relation - to each other, to an unjust society and to the polluted environment, as well as to the Transcendent from which one is alienated, as constitutive elements in the conception of the human person.

3. Psychoanalysing the Institutions of Society

By society one does not mean just one to one or person to person relationships, but also the whole gamut of the institutions of society that sustain, nurture and shape that relationship. We will need help from psychoanalysts and psychiatrists as well as from other scientists, artists, writers, philosophers and others to analyse in depth the pattern of our involvement in these institutions and to help release some of our social repressions about these faceless institutions into the people's general conscious awareness.

We must see how we ourselves have been responsible not only for the creation of all sorts of distortions in these social institutions; but we must also accept collective responsibility for actually repressing in the people's consciousness the conscious awareness of the anti-human characteristics of institutions related to the state, bureaucracy, media, information, science-technology, international finance, trade, commerce, industry and so on. Our social unconscious is teeming with distressing perceptions deeply repressed, social guilt driven deep into the social unconscious.

This means that neither the religious worker nor the psychotherapist nor any other healer needs to wait for the patient to approach him or her. The pathology is there in society, waiting to be healed by the concerted efforts of healers of many hues. The technique of psychoanalysis will have to be applied to help us see who holds power over us and hides behind some facade, who, often without our knowing, keeps us in thralldom and ignorance, who constantly feeds lies to us, who distorts our perceptions in order to exploit us, who benefits by hurting us.

Of course such a proposal for politicisation of psycho-analysis and psychiatry - for that is what the psycho-analysis of the social entity involves - must sound abhorrent to some of you. It can indeed be a costly exercise.

If we are talking about dispelling illusions and opening ourselves to reality as the main task of the discipline of psychoanalysis, then the technique must be applied also to society, not just to the person who seeks therapeutic help. One cannot escape the politicisation of psychoanalysis, nor run away from psychoanalysis of the societal institutions of political economy, statecraft,

economic production, academic formation, culture and entertainment, sports, war, and even the Leviathan of science-technology itself. In seeking to retain the pristine purity of one's profession by being apolitical, one is actually helping to perpetuate illusions in the consciousness of the people.

4. The Human Person We see today - The Need for a Fresh conceptual frame

The human person which Freud saw and analyzed in the Vienna ghettos of the first decades of this century bears little resemblance to the human person we encounter today in the last decades of the same century in the global jungle of our "smokestack civilisation" as Alvin Toffler calls it. And psychoanalytic theory as well as organized religion cries out for a new paradigm for coping with the ailments and afflictions of this latter human person and society. Religious masters and psychoanalysts have to cooperate with others in diagnosing and applying therapy to society as a whole. For this we need a fresh conceptual framework for the person in society and in the environment, and in relation to the Transcendent.

For that purpose two things need to be done. First, psychoanalysis must recognise the fact that it carries with it the handicaps of the time in which its theory was born: too individualistic and too scientistic and therefore too mechanistic and reductionistic. Second, psychoanalysts will have to revise their view of religion in order to prepare themselves for genuine dialogue with informed and authentic religious masters; and the latter will have to learn to look at psycho-analysis not patronisingly but with real informed understanding.

A new perception of the person will have to go beyond the narrow confines of psychoanalytic and psychiatric theory as it has developed so far. It will have to take into account all that we have come to know about the human person in the various endeavours, not necessarily all academic, of human life. For this religion must also be psychoanalysed and undergo therapy, before it can fruitfully join the dialogue. There is a lot of homework cut out for the leaders of religions here.

5. Psychoanalysis, Religion and the Secular

Let us not kid ourselves. Psychoanalysis is a substitute for religion created by the secular civilisation of the 19th and 20th centuries. It functions today as a religion-substitute, within the framework of a secular world view which is outdated and dangerously unscientific. It has its own dogmas (nowadays, like in religion, hardly affirmed or stated), its own priesthood, and its special discipline.

Oskar Pfister was basically right when he wrote to Freud that his "substitute for religion", i.e. psychoanalysis was "basically the idea of the eighteenth century Enlightenment in proud modern disguise". [**Psychoanalysis and Faith**, op. cit., pp 114-115.]

In any case in his later years Freud had to acknowledge, in his letter to Oskar Pfister on **The Future of an Illusion**, that his view of religion was not part of the psychoanalytic theory:

"Let us be quite clear on the point that the views expressed in my book (i.e. **The Future of an Illusion**, PG) form no part of analytic theory. They are my personal views, which coincide with those of many non-analysts and pre-analysts, but there are certainly many excellent analysts who do not share them"

Perhaps George Steiner was more to the point in his view that Psychoanalysis "provides a secular, though heavily mythological surrogate for an entire range of introspective and elucidatory disciplines extending from private meditation to the metaprivacies of the Confessional". ["A Note on Language and Psychoanalysis" in **International Review of Psychoanalysis** 3 (1976) p 257]

Sudhir Kakar, the Indian Psychoanalyst, goes even further in seeing in Psychoanalysis "the secular Western counterpart to (Hindu) Tantra", with a most elaborate theory of Karma, i.e. theory of the decisive influence of the past upon the present, shortened into one single life-time, and even a secular form of the **guru-sishya** or teacher-disciple relationship in the modern technique of a semi-rational associative meditation (the couch) which the **guru** uses to achieve the inner transformation of the disciple. [**The Analyst and the Mystic -Psychoanalytic Reflection on Religion and Mysticism**, Viking, Penguin Books, 1991]

Meanwhile Freud was perhaps justified in his desire to protect psychoanalysis from the priests and entrust it to "a profession that does not exist yet, a profession of secular ministers of soul who do not have to be physicians and must not be priests." [ibid. p. 126].

Well, many of you are physicians and some of you are even priests and pastors of religious communities. Medicine, Psychoanalysis and Religion - the three have come together here. Can we do some thinking together, about how we can work as teams dedicated to the good of all? Let us suggest three things we can do together, if not here, perhaps in the future:

- a. a psychosocial analysis of religion as a historical phenomenon as well as a contemporary reality;
- b. a well informed analysis of the assumptions behind the scientific secular civilisation, which seems to imprison us in its narrow world; and a critique of the largely unexamined assumptions about healing of body and mind inherent in that civilisation;
- c. outline the basic contours of and orientations for a professional medical training system or a holistic health education programme which can cope with some of these problems.

6. What is Religion?

Freud regretted that he had ignored "the rarer and more profound type of religious emotion as experienced by mystics and saints", as Ernest Jones tells us in his three-volume biography of the Founder of Psychoanalysis. Romain Rolland had mediated to Freud the religious experience of the Indian Hindu saint Ramakrishna - an oceanic experience of the mystery of the infinite. [See Irving B Harrison, "On Freud's View of the Infant-Mother Relationship and the Oceanic Feeling - Some Subjective Influences" in the **Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association**, 27(1979) 399-421].

It is this "oceanic feeling" which Freud tried to interpret as a regression to the limitless primary narcissism of the infant at its mother's breast, an attempt to recapture the total security of the unbreathing infant floating in the limitless ocean of the amniotic fluid in the mother's womb.

Gregory Zilboorg[**Freud and Religion, A Restatement**, London, Chapman, 1958] may have had a point in arguing that Freud's vehement denunciations of religion revealed his own repressed religious convictions, which Freud failed to resolve and had to struggle with all his life. Harrison, in the article cited above, seeks to relate Freud's personal religious conflict, his treatment of religion and the birth of psychoanalysis; obviously Freud consciously and unconsciously resisted the temptation to accept the validity of the mystical vision of total bliss, the "oceanic" peace of the womb.

Several attempts have been made in the history of western thought to touch up Freud's concept of religion and to make it respectable. I can mention, for example, Eric Fromm's distinction between "authoritarian religion" and "humanist religion", which latter recognises the psychologically integrative function of religion. Abraham Kaplan tried to distinguish between infantile, dependent religion, and mature, responsible religion. Paul Ricoeur tried to distinguish between "infantile and idolatrous consolation" and a "consolation according to spirit", free of narcissism and self-seeking. Peter Homans sought to distinguish a "non-pathological religion of transcendence" from dependence on a "transference God". Erik Erikson and Jacob Arlow sought to see religion positively as adaptation and not as neurosis resolution, even myths providing an opportunity for the ego to gain mastery of its conflicts through a healing identification with the central figures of the myth.

I have no quarrel with these noble efforts to redeem religion by distinguishing between good religion and bad religion. Freud probably made the mistake of not making that distinction at all, condemning it all as bad, as Marx and Engels did two generations or three earlier.

My quarrel is with the very notion of religion as it now stands in our secular civilisation and in its radically altered vocabulary. Before the 17th century, the word 'religious' meant "belonging to a monastic community"; and the word "secular" meant its opposite, i.e. not belonging to a monastic community. [for a more detailed treatment of the meaning of these words see my forthcoming **A Light Too Bright**, expected to come out of the SUNY press around this time]

The word 'religion' in the sense in which we use it is largely a creation of the European Enlightenment; it is

the same European Enlightenment of the 18th and 19th centuries which gave the words 'secular', 'secularisation' and 'secularism' their current meaning. The very concepts are creations of the new bourgeois industrial civilisation of 18th century Europe. Europe was unique in making this conscious and bold transition, from a society controlled by the church, to a civilisation repudiating all religious authority and seeking to banish religion altogether from the public realm. [Kemal Ataturk's Turkey tried in our century to imitate Europe at this point, but with doubtful results]

To banish religion from the public realm, i.e. from the State, from the education system, and from the healing system, both the latter being more or less imposed by the state on the people, religion becomes 'privatised', i.e. relegated to the margin of personal choices. In that process Society in the public domain made a fateful choice, namely to accept some form of secularism as **its** religion. Max Weber spoke about the 'desacralisation' of society; it was in fact the imposition of an unscientific atheism on society.

Religion in human history had never been private, a matter of just personal preference. Religion was always something held and practised by a community, though there could sometimes be dissenters. It was always part of a community's self-understanding and its identity; that community may be local, national, regional or worldwide.

We are now living in a civilisation which has some form of secularism for its own religion, while supposedly permitting individuals and groups to follow privately the religion of their preference. In reality, however, all religions and all denominations of religion are group or community affairs, existing today in uneasy tension with the secularist assumptions of State, education and health. In that process religion undergoes some basic distortions like privatisation and marginalisation, which are essentially contrary to the very notion and reality of religion.

Psychoanalysis too has become a privatised religion, whose services you can get on payment if you can afford it. It fits in with the secular assumptions of the Enlightenment civilisation and with its mechanical, closed-system world view. It fills the needs of some in the middle classes, and is therefore very much in the market. It will probably go on even if it does not radically reform itself, like the other religions going on.

7. To Conclude

My distinguished friend and colleague, Fr. Hans Kueng, in an Oscar Pfister lecture six years ago entitled "Religion - The Final Taboo", made a strong plea that Psychoanalysis should shed that Taboo against religion and adopt "a therapy that takes the phenomenon of religion seriously - as one of the specifically human forms of expression", especially the patient's "heart religion". He even offered some criteria "for distinguishing critically between true and false religiousness". One can only quite heartily endorse that plea, though with some significant qualifications.

My point is slightly different. I am not talking only about the personal or heart religion of the individual to be used in psychotherapy. My plea is to practitioners of psychotherapy that they join with others concerned, to reconsider the decision made centuries ago to banish religion from our public life. I recognise the freedom and liberty of the ideology of secularism as a particular religion, but I cannot accept its being imposed on the scientific community, on the academic community and on the healing community.

My desire is that perceptive practitioners of psychotherapy would get together with sensitive practitioners (not the official leadership) of good religion, and with sociological, political, philosophical and other workers committed to truth and to the welfare of humanity, to examine the roots of the sociopathology of our modern civilisation itself. Religion is not primarily a private affair. It is the undergirding structure of every civilisation, even our European Enlightenment civilisation which claims to be free of all religion. Something is rotten in that undergirding structure of this present civilisation. And a good deal of that rottenness comes from this irrational phobia of religion.

Certainly organised religion has been responsible in large part for the reaction against religion which had set in some time ago. There is no doubt that the structures of organised religion in our time carry an unsupportable burden of rottenness. But the answer to that is not to banish religion to the margin, and to leave it there as a matter of no public importance.

Hans Kueng suggested that true humaneness is the hallmark of true religion. And in the concept of **humanum** he includes respect for human values, human rights and human dignity. That reminds me of Eric Fromm's distinction between humanist religion and authoritarian religion. He would say that the aim of humanist religion is fullest self-realisation and the achievement of great internal strength. Clearly Fromm is not only within the individualist framework, but also within the liberal humanist conceptual structure.

The liberal concept of **humanum** will hardly do as a litmus test for the religion that humanity should pursue. Not only is the concept of **humanum** in danger of leaving out the extra-human part of the created order from the consideration, but it also says nothing about the necessarily transcendent dimension of human existence, the source from which the order of reality is sustained and nourished.

When Protagoras first said that Man is the measure of all things, he was not laying down a law, but describing a common practice. Man, or the Human cannot be a measure for other things, both because the things that matter cannot be measured and because there are no ultimate limits to be imposed on the **humanum** since it is, for me as an eastern Christian, the visible image in Christ of the invisible God

In fact I believe Liberal Humanism, which tends to absolutize the human, is more the problem than the solution when it comes to reinstating religion at the centre of life. It too has now become a religion-substitute for many in our culture.

The central issue is to have a dialectical view of the human: on the one hand the human species - both each member of the species, and the many levels of community in the species - should be free and untrammelled by any arbitrary authority imposed from outside; on the other hand it must not think of itself as finally and fully sovereign, but as responsible for each other and for the whole created order, disciplined, subject to the Norms of God - the good, the true and the beautiful, the kind, the loving, and the gracious, the humble, the forgiving, and the life-giving and self-sacrificing.

But no view of the human would be adequate if its inbuilt orientation to the transcendent is stifled or ignored. This orientation should be in society itself, not

just in individuals, though individuals would always be free to try their own non-transcendent religion. The Transcendent at the foundation and source-springs of society, at its **every telos** or provisional goal, and at its final goal, all the way from the beginning to the end of human corporate existence - that is what we need to recover.

I shall not go on to describe what I mean by the Transcendent, both because the Transcendent cannot be caught in words, and because any explanation I give will necessarily be coloured by my own personal religious background. But it is there. I have experienced it, not only in my own life, but also in the lives of persons of different religions, in communities of the various religions of the world.

It is in that Transcendent that we find our own true being, the being of others as well as the being of all, whether of life or non-life, organic or inorganic, part or whole. It is in that Transcendent that human beings together find the healing that psychiatrist and patient alike yearn for. Transcendence experienced in the person's heart; but Transcendence at the heart of the community, Transcendence at the heart of history; Transcendence at the foundation and at the heart of civilisation; Transcendence that goes beyond the ego and the world, in order to bring ego and world back into proper perspective and relation with the All. That is the healing Transcendence of which I speak, and which I yearn for all.

The so-called "oceanic feeling", which Freud found it so difficult to come to terms with, can only be an aspect of the experience of the Transcendent. Its ego-and-world boundary-breaking power is also another aspect of the same. But it is not because of its conflict-resolution power that we espouse the Transcendent; its value is in itself, and not as the panacea or pharmakopion for life's ills. It is not ancillary to something else; it helps everything else make sense, but "making sense" is not the final goal for which the experience of the Transcendent is a means.

Only when the ego lets go of its striving to make sense and to control, does the Transcendent break through. It breaks through where there is both personal and communal catharsis and active waiting. The psychiatrist or the religious master needs it just as much as the client or the patient or the seeker. The healer has to live by it as the healed.

ON PUTTING YOUR BODY IN LINE

(Paul Verghese)/

FRONTIER, on 17.1.67

Perhaps the most frivolous and most controversial event in the Church and Society World Conference in Geneva was the "March". It was organized by the youth delegates and young stewards, though more than half of the Conference took part in it.

They marched from the Ecumenical Centre, the venue of the Conference, to the Place des Nations, in front of the European office of the U.N. They carried placards saying, for example, "World in Peace or World in pieces", "The Church must be where the action is", "Justice not charity for the poor", "the arms race has no winner", "Apartheid against God", "New Structures for a New World".

At the place des Nations, they read a statement, which said in French, Indonesian, German, Spanish, English and Japanese:

"We believe that: Since Hiroshima the possibility of war has become the potentiality of global suicide and the destruction of all life. We therefore commit ourselves to working towards a future without war.

"We believe that: The present conflict in Vietnam is a contemporary tragedy of hideous proportions. We plead for the immediate cessation of the fighting.

"We believe that: Human and physical suffering from ignorance, poverty and disease can be eliminated by man's present resources and knowledge. Economic, political, and social justice are a universal responsibility and

can only be achieved through international cooperation. We call for a more equitable sharing of wealth and the application of human knowledge and resources both within all nations and from the richer nations to the poorer ones.

"We believe that: Racial, ethnic and cultural oppression and discrimination threaten the struggle for universal human values. We call for an end to all forms of such oppression and discrimination, not only in more blatant forms such as apartheid, but also in more subtle manifestations such as paternalism.

WE STAND HERE AND COMMIT OURSELVES, OUR SOULS,
AND OUR BODIES."

What were these young people trying to do? The international press, in so far as it gave the march any coverage at all, was somewhat derisive. So were many of the senior delegates and some of the younger ones.

The controversy was not about the content of the placards or the statement; but about the technique itself. And the concern of this article is not even about the technique, but about what lies behind the effort of the young people.

The Conference was one of the best with regard to professional competence on the issue, world representativeness, and lay participation. It has produced what may turn out to be some of the best pieces of "consensus thinking" by Christians on world issues.

Yet, the young people were frustrated. They felt, on the one hand, somewhat left out, along with many senior people, by the forbiddingly technical nature of some of the discussions. They also felt that the issues were being tackled in much too academic a manner and not as live human issues.

But the main reason for their frustration was that there was no "action" and too much speaking. They felt the need, as one put it, "to put their bodies in line", to express their commitment in some non-cerebral, tangible, physical way. "Meeting of minds" seems to leave young people unsatisfied. They believe that words can never carry a sufficient sense of urgency and can often be a substitute rather than a preparation for action. They wanted to say it by doing rather than by talking. Commitment, they said, ^{than} has to be expressed bodily, by an act, rather simply mentally, by words.

Now here is a fundamental problem to which more attention needs to be given. It is not just young people who are surfeited with words. People are losing confidence in conferences and speeches, perhaps because there are so many of them and they don't always seem to result in change.

The ecumenical movement as well as the churches in general, are in a crisis of communication. Christianity, especially its active Western wing, has a tremendous volume of words to its credit. But a good 90% of its output in the last 400 years since the innovation of printing was largely irrelevant by the time it came out. We have already talked too much in order to continue to be heard with respect. To many the Church still seems to pose as the treasure house of all

wisdom, the "teacher of the world". That charm has been more than once proved false. We need to learn to speak with more modesty, and prove the authenticity of our words by matching action. We need to put our "Word" theology in its proper context of the liturgy, which is an act and not just a form of words. The Eucharistic principle of participating in Christ's action by our bodily action needs to be reinstated in our ecumenical procedures.

Faith itself has to be expressed in bodily acts, like Baptism and the Eucharist. Perhaps one reason behind the growth of unbelief in our time may be the increasing pace of alienation by the over-spiritualization and over-verbalization of faith, worship and social concern.

The conference-committee-consultation technique needs to be reviewed in the light of this fundamental theological point. Pioneering action by the Church speaks more authentically than avant-garde statements.

People were brought together at Geneva, to an amazing degree representative of the world Church (non-Catholic). Their minds met and clashed; theoretical agreements and disagreements were brought to light; many new insights and much fresh information became available to the participants. The conference was indeed a significant experience for all.

Yet, one question that kept coming up again and again was the relation of all that we were saying to the Christian faith itself. Here again perhaps people were asking for an intellectual connection between politics and economics on the one side and the Gospel on the other.

The theology by which revolution, technology, urbanization, secularization and everything else under the sun could be made to follow easily from the Gospel does not always carry conviction.

The Christian element in the conference could have found better expression in its life of worship, if only the churches were not so divided. Again the Eucharist rather than any intellectual theology has to be the bridge between the Christian character of such a conference and its concerns about the life of man. The Eucharist is a way of "putting our bodies in line" that we need to make more creative use of, in ecumenical conferences despite our unhappy divisions.

In a sense, it can be said that a Eucharistic milieu and a eucharistic theology alone can give a proper spiritual orientation for our social concerns. Otherwise, the thin line now dividing a shallow humanism and a proper Christian social concern seems likely to become more faint.

But this requires much more sustained creative thinking, and a change of perspective in current theological developments. This brief essay can only draw attention to the need, but not seek to supply it.

REDEFINING THE GOOD SOCIETY

Some Reflections on one Aspect of the Theme

(Paulos Mar Gregorios)

1. The theme as formulated seems to imply certain assumptions which need to be examined. First, can the Good Society be defined at all. not to speak of any 'redefinition'? What is the prevailing definition of the good society which we are now seeking to redefine? Certainly there never has been **one** precise model of the good society which would fit at all times and in every given situation. Several possible models can at different times be constructed, depending on a people's historical experiences, geo-political situation, geography, population, resources, cultural development, technological advancement and several similar factors prevailing at a given time in a given situation. But right now we have no one agreed upon definition of the "good society". We are all largely ad-hocists and pragmatists, when it comes to defining the good society. We will take this job of 'redefining' as more meaning reorienting ourselves on the pathway to the future, rather than precisely defining or redefining.

2. Second, do we construct societies after a mentally conceived model, as we seem to do in the case of buildings,

roads, dams, or a piece of clothing or a work of art? Of course there is what is known as planning, which sets targets and schedules, provides resources and personnel, and achieves or fails to achieve certain specific goals. Social engineering has often tried, but in fact failed, to follow the methods and models of civil engineering. Societies are not made out of whole cloth, or out of building materials readily available in the market, but out of existing socio-economic and cultural-scientific conditions, of course bringing in such elements from outside as are deemed necessary and available. The platonic ideal of mentally conceiving the best society and then sitting down to construct it, does not seem to work. It did not work in the days of Plato or Plotinus (Platonopolis, 3rd century AD) either. All we can hope to do is to chart some points on the horizon, and to find ways of moving in that direction, starting from where we are and not from a **tabula rasa**. This demands first of all a fairly thorough analysis of where we are today, how we got there from an earlier starting point, what prevents us today from moving, and of the forces pulling society in directions other than the one she should be pursuing. The best analysis in the world would not get us far, if we do not fully understand the forces fighting against the good society, because they think they can profit better from a bad society, and develop an adequate structure of counter-vailing power.

3. It is also an important question to ask: **who** defines the good society in each situation, and **who** sets common goals

for a whole nation? There are very few constitutions in the world which have resulted from a free consensus among the people. To take the example of India, the present Constitution of India was not born out of a nation-wide consultation among all the people of our land. Our Founding Fathers, as was also the case in the USA, were a noble, humanitarian team, though there were some exceptions. In India, some of the interests of Dalits and other backward classes were ably safeguarded by personalities like Ambedkar. But who was there to articulate and defend the needs and aspirations of the many communities of Girijans, Adivasis and Tribals? The majority or "Mainstream" opted for commodity development, thinking primarily in terms of GDP, jobs, loans, savings, investments and the lot. The Adivasis, left to themselves, would have, in choosing national goals, emphasized living close to nature, curbing one's needs and our greed for commodities, putting the accents on **peoples' community development**, rather than on largely wasteful and sometimes useless commodity development, which can serve only the interests of the trading, business and finance communities. So, who are we here defining the Good Society for others? What is our representativeness in relation to the people of India, and in relation to the global human community. Can a nation like ours choose what western liberals choose, and leave the Girijans to the awfully unkind choice of either joining the mainstream and thereby losing their identity, or being confined to unnatural habitats and there going to seed. The people as a whole, if they are truly to make a common choice, can do so only through a people's

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revolutionary movement sweeping the nation as a whole in a wave of people-led reform and social renewal, and not under government or ruling party aegis.

4. The present document has chosen six aspects of the good society as objectives to be pursued: Liberty, Equity, Fulfilment, Community, Science and Non-violence. Somewhat arbitrary, but still a great improvement on the French Revolution's **liberte'**, **egalite'** and **fraternite'**. Replacing **fraternite'** by the four new concepts of meaning, community, non-violence and the right use of science, should be welcomed. But are we stuck with some of the concepts thrown up by the specificities of western liberal-capitalist development? Some of these very categories and concepts themselves carry over aspects of their peculiar western historical development, the struggles among feudal nobility, the industrial bourgeoisie and the working people in farms and factories. Our own history is different and we need fresh categories for choosing national goals. Take concepts like democracy, development, liberty and freedom. These concepts have substantially different content in their situation and ours. The concept of freedom, for example, is a richer, nobler concept, but the west still likes to talk about **liberation** than about **freedom**, a concept with which the West seems uncomfortable.

And **equity**, which now replaces the French **egalite'** cannot be a sufficient substitute for the richer concept of **justice** which many would regard as the essential foundation of the

good society. Peace and Security, Ecological health, etc. could of course come under "Non-violent and Humane World Order", but could have been made more explicit in our subgroup titles. At this stage all that is meant is a warning about the perils involved in "category choices". The categories in which we think often decisively affect the nature of our conclusions.

5. It seems that there are two ways of structuring the paradigm for our discussion here. The first is the one which most such conferences follow, and which we ourselves at this Fourth Indira Gandhi Conference are likely to adopt. This method consists in basically accepting the western liberal-democratic ideology and categories, make some slight changes here and there, often from a western Marxist perspective, but without stopping to ask any fundamental questions about the philosophical foundations of that very ideology and category structure, accepting the prevailing pragmatic method of not asking questions one is afraid of asking, because one's training as an academic has not equipped one to do so adequately or with confidence.

6. The second method is infinitely more difficult and time-consuming as well as being beyond the competence of most of us, and therefore hardly likely to be adopted here. This is to begin by asking some simple but profound fundamental questions, as our great Indian ancestors taught us to do. Begin with questions like: What is there? How do we know? And

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where do we, as human beings, fit into that Reality? What is real fulfilment for human persons and communities, or in more traditional (and, as is to be anticipated, male-chauvinistic) language, What is the true end of Man)

5. After these preliminary remarks, let me confine myself to some reflections on one of the sub-themes: "Science in Society". This is a topic on which I have been privileged to work for several years with some of the leading scientists of all countries. (See my **Science For Sane Societies**, Paragon, New York, 1987). "Modern Science", as distinguished from pre-Newtonian science, is a specific outgrowth of western socio-economic history, and bears the marks thereof. We have space here only to highlight some features of this "modern science".

6. The concepts of **science** and **scientific method** are notoriously difficult to define. The precise contours (demarkation criteria) of the dividing line between **science** and **non-science** simply cannot be determined. There is no **a priori** definition of science and scientific method, beyond simply denoting what is generally accepted by the prevailing scientific community which happens to have certain given ways of working together, and certain norms for certifying scientific propositions.

7. The Public Character of Science. There may have been a time in the past when the distinction between "pure science" and "applied science" had some relevance. Today more than 95% of science is applied, and scientific research is

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today so bound up with technological prowess, that the distinction between science and technology is today difficult to maintain. The cutting edges of scientific research are so bound up with sometimes unaffordable, and often unpurchaseable or unavailable, high technology. This is so in High Energy Physics, in Super-conductivity, and in biology, biochemistry and genetics. Scientific research is no longer an open possibility for all societies. Science, having lost its innate public character, becomes inauthentic, and something less than its original true self.

8. There was a time when it was part of the Canon of Science that all scientific knowledge should be public knowledge, open to experimental confirmation or refutation by any competent scientist. This is no longer so. The world scientific community today is divided into two classes: first is that class of scientists employed by defence or military establishments and large profit-oriented corporations, who are sworn to secrecy and are not allowed to share their scientific knowledge with others, for security reasons or for monopoly patent/copyright considerations.

9. **Science in the Service of War and Profit,** This has at least two major consequences: First, war and profit minded establishments, notoriously unpublic and thus undemocratic, can afford to corner the best scientific talent in the market by paying them extra incentives; the cutting edge of current scientific research thus goes in search of greater killing

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capacity or greater profit and power for the few. Science is thus prostituted and misused in large part. So little of science, and that too not the best talent, is available for humane purposes like healing, healthy and economic housing development, non-monopoly non-chemical food production, and for good education in a healthy environment.

10. **The Commercialisation of Science.** The second consequence is that science/technology itself becomes commodity and private property. Since high-tech is much in demand by the poor, for good or bad reasons, its high marketability becomes a new tool of exploiting and oppressing the poor. The whole corpus of patenting and copyright laws lead us to a situation where knowledge itself becomes a commodity for trade and profit making, and also for exploitation and enslavement. This commercialisation of science and the prostitution of sci/tech for mass murder and easy profit, detract from the original nobility of science and technology.

11. There can be no doubt about the immense magnitude of the achievements of modern science and the technology based on it. In the evolution of the human species, there have been several quantum jumps in human capacity for good and evil with the advent of modern sci-tech. Since higher capacity for good and evil is a top class challenge to the human will (both individual and social) to direct its abilities towards the good and not towards evil, the age of modern science-technology demands from humanity greater moral and spiritual effort;

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instead we are on the whole letting ourselves morally disintegrate, by choosing a culture of meaningless affluence, instant gratification of all urges, and flabby moral vigour. Here even religion and its leadership, instead of setting standards as they should, seem to fall below the prevailing moral standards of ordinary people. Scientists themselves had at one time an enviably high moral level, in their commitment to the truth and in their pursuit of knowledge. We have a situation now where those high standards of scientists are being eroded by the blandishments of power, pelf and paisa. The link between science and integrity seems to grow weaker day by day.

12. The hopes pinned on to Modern Science were many, but most of them have come to grief. Once it was thought by some at least that Scientific Rationality would provide us with the right morality. Every attempt so far has failed to yield the desired fruit. Again, once it was thought that scientific reasoning would open all the doors to all knowledge. We now know that science has its limits, and that much that we know does not come from science, but from other forms of experience, including human relations, art and music, literature and drama, pain and pleasure, and perhaps even what is termed religious experience. It was quite foolishly believed by many once that scientific knowledge is objective and therefore true, while other convictions in so far as they are subjective, are prone to error. Today we know that totally unsubjective objectivity is unattainable, since subjectivity is an essential aspect of all knowing. And we know that current scientific knowledge is subject to revision

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in the light of future knowledge, and that there is no "finally proved" status to any scientific proposition.

13. Even more pernicious was the ridiculous dogma propounded by 19th century European Positivists to the effect that all human knowledge invariably passes through three stages: theological, metaphysical and scientific, and that the latter is the only true knowledge which supersedes the two previous infant(theological) and adolescent (metaphysical) stages of human evolution; the conclusion was that science makes all theology and metaphysics obsolete. Today this is recognized by sensitive people for what it is - a dogma produced by the European Enlightenment of the 18th and 19th centuries with the comic effort of European thought to do away with all external authority. But many of the culpable attitudes stemming from this European hubris still prevails among many scientists.

14. Perhaps the most damaging caveat against modern science is that its gnoseological technology not only distorts reality, but even deforms the human person. It starts from many unexamined assumptions: for example. it dogmatically and unscientifically assumes the given-ness of a self-existent entity called 'Nature' which is not contingent upon anything else; the frequent assumption that things are what they appear to be; the Naive or Constructive Realism which refuses to ask questions about the ontological status of phenomena because such questions cannot be answered by science; worst of all the mistaken assumption that man, the knowing subject, can stand outside the world and objectify, know and manipulate it.

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Science has tended to distort the human personality by overvaluing objectivity and underplaying subjectivity, which latter is by far the richer aspect of human existence. The long years of disciplining oneself to be always objective renders human beings very inhibited in their subjective human relations.

15. The uncritical devotion of both scientists and lay people to Modern Science and Technological Rationality as the ultimate arbiter of truth, bears some resemblance to the uncritical obedience of Medieval European society to the Roman Catholic Church as the ultimate arbiter of truth in all fields. The notorious medieval dictum: *Roma locuta est, Causa finita est* (Rome has spoken, the matter is settled) has today become: *Scientia locuta est, Causa finita est*. Medieval priests in their black robes, Cross in hand, have been today replaced by Modern Scientists in their white smocks, computer at hand.

16. The questioning of the Medieval church' arbitrary authority took a long time to become effective. There were the pre-Renaissance protests of simple peasants against the exploitation and domination by the Church as major landholder. Then came the European Renaissance which counter-posed the authority of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and the Greek Classics to the authority of the Church, as an alternative to the authority of the Church, especially in art, music and literature. The Renaissance Popes, many of them both erudite and self-indulgent, managed to domesticate the Renaissance

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within the Church. Then came the Protestant Reformation which pitted Scriptural authority against Papal authority and broke loose from the Roman Catholic Church in the 16th century, developing its own forms of non-responsible authority. Only the French Revolution and the European Enlightenment of the 18th and 19th centuries, finally triumphed by repudiating the authority of King and Priest, of Church and Tradition, and setting up human rationality as the final arbiter of truth. It is in that ethos that Modern Science developed and flourished. Man became the measure and centre of all things, with Humanism, whether liberal or Marxist, became the dominant ideology of our own era. Human reason gave sufficient evidence of its own omnipotence or omni-competence.

17. We are in the post-modern era, where intellectuals want to go beyond the norms of modernity. This is not the occasion to propound the doctrine of the post-modernists or to refute it. The main point is that the people's revolt against scientific rationality, against the Urban-Industrial Technological Society, and the Europe-generated model of the modern nation-state, has only begun to be heard by the academics. The protest will take at least several decades to mature and gain sufficient momentum to compel attention. I firmly believe that when the protest matures, the foundations of a new society will also come to light.

18. Since the purpose of this exercise here is not the denigration of science, but seeking for some reliable founda-

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tions for the 'good society' which we seek to redefine and reconstruct, the thrust of this paper is to warn against any facile assumptions about science and technology being the major tool for such definition and construction. Neither can the task be done by putting together Science/technology and a packet of specially chosen 'moral values'.

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL
Motion *+ Paul*
IN THE SOCIAL ECONOMIC STRUCTURES OF TODAY

(Fr Paul Verghese)

First, let me express my gratitude and thanks to the organizers of this conference for the privilege they have graciously extended to me to participate in a meeting of representatives of all religions in the U.S.S.R convened to promote peace in the world. No cause on earth is nobler than that of peace with justice and dignity for all mankind. No cause on earth is dearer to my heart than that of a world-wide society without war and aggression, without oppression and injustice, where the weak individual or the small nation is never at the mercy of the mighty, where might is always tempered with love and justice, where power is fully controlled by the whole of society and used for the welfare of all and not to stamp out dissent and criticism.

And we, the representatives of all religions, have a special role to play in this noble cause. Our record as religions in the matter of pursuing peace with justice has not been the best. We have often sided with reaction and supported the status quo in the name of God. We have closed our eyes at the spectacle of the rich oppressing and exploiting the poor, the mighty bullying and harassing the weak.

We owe it to the poor to champion their cause and make amends for our past neglect. And peace can never come to the world until the rich and the mighty are brought under control of the whole of humanity. Peace can come only when aggression, oppression and exploitation are removed from the face of the earth.

What can ordinary human beings do about this? That is our question. The "individual", I am not greatly interested in. He is a creation of human selfishness, the ego who breaks himself off from the community to pursue his own individual faith and profit.

Persons, I am interested in. But persons always exist in relation with other persons and within society. Persons are shaped just as much by the society in which they grow up as by their own individual choices.

What can persons do in relation to the political and economic structures in order to bring peace to the world?

I wish to propose ^{five}~~from~~ different things that persons like you and me who are in positions of religious leadership can do to promote peace in the world.

1. Study and take pains to understand the structure of human economic and political organization in the world and within each nation. We should find out how in each country the rich are exploiting the poor, ^{and} by what means the mighty are oppressing the weak. We should find out how some rich nations are getting richer and are at the same time exploiting the poor nations of the world through aid and trade. We should study how it is inevitable that in any uncontrolled economy, the richer classes ^{who} have the necessary infra-structure ~~to~~ go on exploiting the poor and getting richer and richer, while the poor ^{shall} are hardly able to make both ends meet. Study how the same pattern operates among nations, how the rich nations ~~already have~~ who already have the infra-structure ^{already} for industrial development are ~~exploiting~~ the poor nations while pretending to aid them.

2. Unite with the poor of the world to demand a world society with justice for all. It is all right to build socialism in one country or many countries; but if we forget the poor of the world, even within a socialist economy we can become bourgeois, comfort-loving, acquisitive, selfish, nationally chauvinistic. We ^{should} ~~can~~ never allow our nations to forget the poor of the world. This is something which we need to say particularly to all the nations

of Eastern Europe. The socialist countries have been champions of the poor and the oppressed, both in their own country and abroad. Now several socialist countries are reaching the stage where ^{most} people are fairly well off. We know that these nations do not want to forget us the poor of the world, but we are afraid they are tempted to pay more attention to building a consumer economy and to provide themselves with bourgeois comforts, while the rest of the world is ^{still} in wretched poverty ~~xxxxx still~~. Affluence inevitably brings the love of comfort. A little money in the hand makes ^{especially if there are rich fellows around} one desire for more, And one may be able to make more money by collaborating with the rich nations of the west than by being a friend of the poor nations. Soon, before one realizes it, one finds it convenient to forget us, the poor of the world. I know that you will not let that happen to you. You the citizens of the USSR will keep up the struggle against the rich oppressors of the world and will not join hands with them. We know that you will not settle down to enjoy your wealth, while we are still starving. You are our brothers. We know that you do not want to betray us.

The role of the citizen today is to keep society from becoming too consumption-and-comfort-oriented, while there is still so much poverty around. And this can be done only by being in close touch with the poor of the world and by refusing to adopt bourgeois standards in ^{one's} ~~your~~ own personal life. We

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also to seek solidarity with other anti-imperialist, anti-oppression movements like the new wave of student protest, and ⁻⁵⁻ the determined struggle of negroes in the U.S.A. against white domination.

The people of the U.S.S.R are a pioneer people in the struggle against oppression and exploitation. And even when they have overcome their own poverty, they should not lose their solidarity with the ^{& oppressed} poor of the world, even if such poor are in nations which ~~harass~~ harass your borders and ~~threat~~ threaten your security. The poor of the world cannot afford to be divided. And ^{religions} citizens have a major responsibility in maintaining ^{^ awareness of the} ~~that~~ solidarity ~~at~~ ^{of all} a human level. ^{being}, especially the poor & the oppressed of the world.

3. Change the structures of the world International structures today are adequate only to foster injustice. The rich and the mighty control the international organizations. Trade, commerce and banking are all loaded in favour of the rich nations of the west, and even when new international monetary agencies are established supposedly under the auspices of all nations, they tend to serve more the interests of western finance than of the economy of the developing countries.

It is the citizen's responsibility to rouse the consciences of men to see the pattern of injustice in the world-wide economic structures. There has to develop a new pressure all over the world among common people to seek and to find the beginnings of a new international economic structure which is not controlled by the rich alone. We have

to begin to agitate for a world government and a world economic structure which is open, which is controlled by the masses, and which does not grant a special protection to the interests of the rich. Only that way can peace be assured. We must agitate for the liquidation of all nuclear armaments and the gradual demilitarization of nations. The colossal wastes of today in armaments, packaging and advertising, should be devoted to education, health, and industrial and agricultural development. Only a world government can do this. And ~~xxx~~ our job as citizens is to break through the pessimism and cynicism of those in power in all our governments who regard a world government as a utopian dream. What can mankind achieve if it has no utopias to strive for? Let not the power interests of the world, who are threatened by the idea of a new world government, deceive us. It is both possible and necessary. There is no other solution.

And citizens should ~~xxxx~~ boldly demand such a world government.

4. Getting down to the primary structures The citizen's major contribution, however, will not come at the level of international and national structure, but rather at the primary base of human economic and social relations. In a country like

mine, the five-year plans have been a general failure, ^Smostly because the plan programmes were handed down from above, rather than being developed by people in the villages. The primary base was ~~not~~ not educated to see their common interests. Their basic egoism remained unaltered, and the ship of national planning foundered on this bed-rock of the primary economic base which had not been reeducated and restructured. The citizen alone can develop the right primary structures. Selfishness and individualism, the poisonous weeds of modern capitalism, are spreading even in socialist societies. The case is much worse in countries like India. Unless we can mobilize the masses at the village level, we have no hope for the future, whatever government comes at the centre. In socialist countries also the fight against individualist egoism must go on for ever and ever.

*structures
economic
←*

Peace is undivided - for all mankind. So we need world structures for peace.

But Peace is primarily a quality of the human spirit - both collectively and personally. There is a natural tendency in man to fight against the other and to fend for oneself. This applies at local, regional, and national levels. The clash of collective egoisms is the enemy of peace. The task of religion is to train man away from personal and collective egoism. *to hold all things in common as a trust to be concerned first for others and for all, and to work to produce, in order that we may give to all we need*

May God grant us wisdom to unite in the cause against aggression and war by promoting unselfish service and love for all mankind.

(Dr. Paulos Gregorios)

1. Introduction

This paper intends to provide a basis for discussion of the roots of the growing communal conflict in India and of possible ways of promoting greater communal harmony and national integration.

The context is one of anxiety, but not panic - anxiety about the unity of India as a nation. If there is one point at which India has been so far successful, since its independence in 1947, it is the preservation of this national unity. Precisely that unity is today in jeopardy.

At one time it was conflict between language groups that threatened our national unity. The shift from the 28 states formed by the Constitution of India (based on pre-independence administrative units) to a pattern of linguistic states began in 1952, with the agitation for Telengana begun by Potti Srivamalu, and leading to the decision to form the state of Andhra on 19th December 1952.

Here we see an interesting phenomenon of the long-standing class conflict in India being obscured and distorted into linguistic or communal or inter-regional conflict.

The largest and perhaps most resolute spate of mass demonstrations in independent India was not based on a conflict of class interests, but by the demand for a separate linguistic state on the part of all classes in Andhra. The National Question thus became oriented, not towards the emancipation of the oppressed and exploited classes, but rather towards administrative reorganisation based on linguistic interests. After two years of study (1953-55) by the States Reorganisation Commission, the political map of India was redrawn by the new law which came into force on November 1, 1956, dividing our land into fourteen largely linguistic states and six Union Territories administered by the Centre.

But the struggle for new linguistic states continued, particularly in those states which were multi-lingual (Bombay, Assam and Punjab). This resulted in more new linguistic states - Gujarat and Maharashtra (1960), Punjab and Haryana (1966), Nagaland (1963) Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura

and so on. In this new struggle religion became an important element in the identity of a state. This is especially clear in the case of Punjab and Haryana, where the language groups of Panjabi and Hindi were also coterminous with religious groups of Sikhs and Hindus.

The Akali Dal gave to the concept of "Panjabi-Sabah" a more religious than linguistic connotation, since religious sentiments were found to be more powerful than linguistic loyalties to move the people to mass demonstrations for a separate Panjabi state. This shift from linguistic to religious basis for a state was nurtured by religious-chauvinist elements gradually taking over the Akali Dal.

The ethnic-religious element became also the basis of the Tribal States and Union Territories - Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram, and so on. Tribal religions became the basis for autonomy and resistance to Hindu domination. In some cases (i.e. Meghalaya, Nagaland, and Mizoram), a form of Western Christianity becomes the dominant religion of the State.

But in the re-organisation of states care had been taken not to allow a Muslim majority state, barring the unavoidable exception of Jammu and Kashmir, where the Hindus are half the number of Muslims. But wherever Muslims are a substantial share of the population, i.e. in Uttar Pradesh (about 2 crore Muslims, and 9 crore Hindus), in Jammu and Kashmir (35 lakhs Muslims, 16 lakhs Hindus), in Assam (40 lakh Muslims and 120 lakhs Hindus), Bihar (80 lakhs Muslims, 5 crore Hindus), there are major communal tensions between Muslims and Hindus.

Even in States with a long tradition of comparative communal harmony, new conflicts erupt into violence. This is a symptom of a deep malaise. Tamilnadu and Kerala have recently had incidents involving Hindus, Muslims and Christians.

Some examination of the underlying causes of the malaise would help in a diagnosis of the social disease and prescribing remedies. What is presented here is offered as a discussion starter.

2. The Erosion of the Secular Framework and the Communalisation of the Political Process.

The notion of a "Secular State" imposed on India from above or from the west, has not taken very deep roots in our soil. Nehru's idea of modernisation - western, scientific and secular - still remains a strange notion in the minds of most of our people, though some of our elites pretend to be at home in it. We are a basically religious people, more trusting than rational, more accepting than questioning, more intuitive than analytical, more patriarchally minded than democratically inclined, exalting personal leadership over the group mind, regional and communal rather than national and secular in our basic loyalties. Verbal formulations, party platforms and ideological systems mean little to our masses. The government is our ma-baap, and the Prime Minister our god or goddess. We condone much of what the government does, just as we overlook the faults of our parents. Public opinion, as a major force in governmental decision-making, has only recently begun to emerge. Only a small elite, trained in western ways, understand the concepts of the Secular State and democratic government.

Casteism and Communalism have always dominated Indian Politics. In recent years domination has been intensified. Even as rival parties field candidates to win the votes of the same caste, candidates appeal more and more to their own loyalty to the caste. The change brought about by the election process in the caste structure itself is significant. The Brahmin Caste, once at the top, can no longer command, since their numbers are not large enough. The larger castes at the centre and bottom of the caste ladder tend to dominate or vie with each other for control of power.

This implies also the more openly religious or communal basis of several political parties - the Muslim league, the Jan Sangh, the Akalis, to cite some obvious examples. But even other minor parties conceal a communal orientation behind a democratic name (Kerala Congress for example).

But the most important thing in Indian politics is perhaps the appeal of the leader who is honest, cares for the poor and does not seek to enrich himself, the self denying, do-gooding, ascetic star as political candidate (N.T. Rama Rao, M.G. Ramachandran).

We cannot come to terms with the realities of Indian communal conflicts, without taking into account the fact that the secular democratic concept appeals mainly to a growing western-educated elite, and to some extent to peasants and workers trained in the socialist ideology of Marxism.

Secularism never took root in the minds of the Indian people. It is a concept alien to our culture, chosen in the context of the division of India, one part deliberately choosing to be a one-religion state, while the other consciously refused to become a religious state at all. What we should have chosen at that time was not perhaps a secular state, but a pluralistic state, which gives no preference to any one or more religions. It is high time we reconsidered the concept of a secular state and found a concept more true to our history, culture and present situation.

We should also find ways of transcending and overcoming the communalisation of the political process. This can be done only by legislation banning political parties with a clear communal basis, by insisting that political parties should have a clear commitment to the guiding principles of the Constitution, and by a voluntary effort on the part of the present parties to reduce the number of parties on the political scene and to adopt clear political, economic and social platforms by which their performance can be judged.

3. The Erosion of National Leadership

Since 1947 we had lived under the protective shadow of great national leaders who had made significant personal sacrifices in the struggle for national independence. People accepted them as national leaders, irrespective of the religious^{ns} or caste community to which they belonged. People trusted them and looked to them to guard the interests of all the people of India. They can no longer do so. Many leaders today fight for regional or communal interests.

This undermines the national loyalty and national identity of the people. People retreat into narrower identities based on religion, caste, region or group interest. There is nothing in the present that appeals to national loyalty except external threats. When we are in danger of attack from our neighbours, our level of national loyalty shoots up. But once the external danger recedes, the loyalty level also goes down.

The way to reinvoke that national loyalty is to organize a national effort on a mammoth scale which transcends all communal and regional loyalties. A huge literacy and sanitation campaign, organized by all political parties together, with religious leadership participating would be one example,. This will need extensive planning, training of personnel, and administrative control that can prevent mis-use of the campaign, as has happened in the past, when such campaigns have been used for promoting communalism. This would be a proposal that this seminar could launch into the public mind, and start some initiatives to bring party leaders together for planning much a campaign. Doctors, nurses, teachers, students—all could be enlisted and trained on a mass scale all over the nation. The important thing is to keep the campaign trans-communal, and not allow it to be dominated by political pressures from communal groups. It has to be led and inspired by a group of people who can be seen as being above narrow communal interests.

Such a national campaign, which will demand the organisation of multi-communal groups visiting all the villages and cities of India, would require enormous determination and organisation as well as resources. It will have to be organized by the general public with government assistance, with all political parties and religious bodies participating. If it is carried out with discipline and imagination, it could mean a significant step beyond our present communal and national stalemate. It may also throw out a new type of national leadership, different from the ones now created by local, regional and communal politics.

4. The rise of mistrust among communities

We have some 85 million Muslims in the country, (61.5 million in 1971), more than in any nation except Indonesia and Bangladesh. Our Muslim population is larger than the population of half the nations of the world. The way this

"minority" behaves and is treated by others decides the communal temper in our country.

First comes our image of Islamic Community in India. So many people in India look upon Muslims as in some way foreign to India. Such people forget that these are the sons and daughters of the soil of India who made in 1947 a conscious choice to remain citizens of India as a "secular state", when they could have made a choice to emigrate to an Islamic State. They trusted this nation and its "secular" leadership. That trust has to be perpetually honoured. When that trust is breached, certainly mistrust will take root and disrupt our national unity. It is a sacred trust. All communities in India should honour that trust and give no occasion for mistrust.

It is equally important that all minority groups, whether Muslims, Christians, Sikhs or Parsis, earn the trust of the nation by their own conduct and attitudes.

It is a fact, however, that mistrust has been generated. Many people think that it began in 1977, with the Janata inter-regnum. The minorities feel that there was in 1977 the beginning of a policy of keeping members of the minority groups (with a few exceptions of a special kind) from key or strategic positions of leadership. There was official support for unconstitutional and discriminatory legislation (like the M.C. Tyagi Bill). The minority communities began to feel that the secular state concept is eroding and that some influential groups were trying to make India a Hindu nation, (with Jains, Buddhists and perhaps Sikhs being accepted as part of the Hindu tradition), but Muslims and Christians somehow regarded as less than Indian.

The Sikhs have always adamantly refused to be regarded as Hindus, and the growing demand for a state that is free from Hindu control has to be explained in terms of growing fear of that control. But separate autonomous states where one religious community dominates, whether it be Sikh, Muslim, Hindu or Christian, would again be a violation of the secular principle, and India cannot afford such a development, in the Punjab, in Kashmir, in the North-East or anywhere else.

How can we, in the context of such mis-trust, remain a united nation? It is clearly against the interests of our nation to foment such inter-communal distrust. It may be in the temporary interest of certain other nations who do not like the unity of India to aid and abet those who create communal conflict in India. But as a nation, it would not be responsible to keep on blaming outside agencies for our communal conflicts. We have to act on our own, resolutely and wisely.

At the same time, the minority communities have a major responsibility here. Especially in the case of Christians and Muslims there is an apparently justified charge that these communities are receiving large sums of money from outside, and that this money and the influence it brings may be used along lines inimical to our national interest. Many Christian communities have been for a long time dependent on outside money and too often outside ideas. This is a hang-over from our colonial past and should soon be remedied. It is a fact, however, that some Christian money from abroad is used for development projects ostensibly in the national rather than communal interest. But even such money leads to the enhancement of institutional power and political influence for some christian communities.

The influx of Muslim money from abroad is more recent in origin and not so directly connected, with our colonial past. Yet, it is a fact that this outside money of Christians and Muslims is a major factor in increasing the mutual distrust among religious communities.

On the other hand, there is some substance to the charge that the religious revival among the majority community is also partly financed by outside money, especially contributions from European and American converts to Hinduism, but possibly also some political money interested in promoting communal ~~harmony~~ ^{disharmony}. Whatever be the facts about this, it is true that the fear of foreign money and its power becomes connected with the resentment about conversions from one religion to ~~other~~ ^{another}. Such problems cannot be settled by legislation about religious conversion.

It is up to the religious communities themselves to disclose the facts to the public about money received from outside and about how it is utilised. A major study undertaken by an objective institute, with the full support of the religious leadership could bring the facts before the public, and permit discussion on the basis of facts. It may also lead to religious communities adopting greater self-discipline in diminishing reliance on outside money, ideas and personnel. Such a study may expose some unpleasant and inconvenient facts, perhaps more embarrassing to Christians and Muslims than to others, but it could lead to policy decisions on the part of religious communities and their foreign benefactors, decisions which could contribute to greater mutual trust among the religious communities.

5. The general climate of acquisitive greed which foments narrow communal loyalties.

The conflict of group interests becomes aggravated by transformations in the political process whereby governments have to make decisions in response to pressures from groups of voters. Few politicians can keep their backing of voters unless they fight for the narrow interests of the groups that vote them to power. And when Government itself becomes the largest dispenser of wealth in the country, the greed of groups to get as much as possible from the government also becomes acute. The political process in India today has become a system of politicians paying back those who financed them and voted them to power, or are likely to do so in the future. The civil service also becomes full of people who will not issue any order or even move a file unless their palms are greased. Salaried people who find it difficult to balance their budgets or to send their children to better schools can hardly resist the temptation to pocket a bribe. And the bribery situation has become so blatant, that most people do not even need to hide the taking of bribes, but have made bribery institutional and convenient.

It is in this context that one has to see the erosion of the higher values in religion. Piety now becomes a way of invoking the deity for greater gains and for protection from being caught. When religion itself thus becomes an instrument of greed, it loses its higher and universalistic content

and becomes base and parochial and contentious^u, even fanatical. Fanatical communal loyalty and strife may be partly explained by a guilty conscience seeking appeasement through religious fanaticism.

The need today is to bring out the best in each religion. The noble^x sentiments in all religions lead to communal harmony, while the base and more aggressive tendencies in each religion are encouraged by a climate of greed.

The ultimate solution to the problem of communal harmony can come only from a just economic order where justice does not become a casualty^s of greed, and the political process is not at the mercy of those who have money. The transition from a greed-based political economy to a more socialist, egalitarian and rigorously just and uncorrupt society is perhaps the only long lasting remedy for the growing problem of communal conflict. Communal disharmony is likely to grow in a political economy where injustice has become regnant and persistent.

The struggle for communal harmony cannot thus be separated from the struggle for a more just, more socialistic and humanitarian society than the present.

The remedies proposed in the next section are at best palliatives. They cannot solve the problem. The issue is one of justice and of commitment on the part of all to the welfare of the whole.

The steps proposed are therefore timidly and hesitatingly advanced, knowing that they do not resolve the problem in the long term. But they could still have some temporary value.

6. Some Practical Steps - An Incomplete List

(a) The organisation of large public meetings for communal harmony, and full media coverage for these.

(b) the organisation of inter-communal vigilance groups in all areas, who will watch the developments and keep in touch with religious groups and their leaders;

(c) the production of children's literature promoting sympathetic understanding of Indian religions, and their introduction into the school curriculum;

(d) the organisation of mass demonstration and silent processions for communal harmony;

(e) appeals by religious leaders for prayer for inter-religious harmony in all religious bodies and institutions; where possible common prayer vigils;

(f) the conduct of seminars on communal harmony and the production of books and pamphlets on the subject, especially in the regional languages;

(g) the organisation of a nation-wide movement for communal harmony with religious leaders from all communities taking a leading role, financed by voluntary contributions, and having a regular publication (popular level) for nation-wide circulation among the masses and in regional languages;

(h) the development of short documentaries and video-tapes for use in places of public entertainment like movie houses.

(i) a major study of foreign finances received by religious communities, leading to steps for their utilisation in the interests of communal harmony rather than inter-communal distrust and conflict;

(j) a major inter-religious study on the relation between the noble and baser elements in religious belief and commitment; how loyalty to noble religious belief becomes corrupted into narrow communal loyalties and greed-inspired conflicts.

(k) a major inter-religious project for the study of the history of the religions of India, and of their present state.

AUTHENTIC SECULAR SOCIETY OR PLURALISTIC HUMAN SOCIETY?

(Fr. Paul Verghese)

The genuinely secular society has been defined as "a state of human relations in which no religion or world view dominates and where no common sense of the timeless order of reality prevails". (1)

This demand on the part of Christians for the secularization of society should be neatly distinguished from the ideology of secularism. The Christian advocates of the former roundly repudiate the latter. Secularism has this in common with secularizationism that they are both concerned only about this world and not with another. Ideological secularism confers on the seculum an absolute meaning and value, which can be discovered by rational means. For the Christian secularizationist, his own understanding of the seculum requires reference to a reality which is not human; for the secularist "Man is the measure of all things".

Secularization is a process, continuing and dynamic, which has been described as "the withdrawal of areas of life and thought from religious - and finally also from

(1) See the next chapter by Charles C. West

metaphysical - control, and the attempt to understand and live in these areas in the terms which they alone offer." Here however is its dilemma. The secularist may quite likely appropriate to himself this self-understanding of the secularizationist, and yet be different from the latter in his basic assumptions, in his evaluation of and expectations about man, nature and history.

The fundamental difference is one of ethos. The secularist is basically optimistic about man, his reason, his destiny and his nature. The secularizationist cannot be described as a pessimist. He would rather call himself a realist. He has no illusions about the perfectibility of man, no vain hopes of finding a perfect pattern for all time for the organization of society, no fond expectations of a kingdom of peace on earth established in history. He has no preconceived notions of what is or what to expect. He is agile and plastic, willing to adjust to new circumstances, never surprised by the turn of events, ready to reconsider earlier judgments in the light of subsequent experience, all but crushed by the realization of the complexity of the relationships within which he lives as a person. Yet, he seeks valiantly to retain his freedom as a person and not to be snowed under by the levelling forces of mass society. He seeks with great skill and some success to spot out the new gods of the secularist and to expose them as vain idols - whether they be an idolized technology, an absolutized scientism, the worship of power, a fanatic nationalism or

even a secular-cultural religion. Even cynicism, which recognizes no absolutes and is in this sense dangerously close to the genuinely secularizationist view, should be exposed as making self-interest the ultimate value.

In terms of philosophy the secularizationist does not belong to any of the schools, though he learns from all of them. He has close affinities with the existentialist, but disagrees with the average existentialist in his view of history.

Existentialism can hardly be termed so much a philosophy as a philosophical approach. Its cardinal principle, in its most oversimplified form, is the assertion that in man, unlike in nature, existence precedes essence. Man is not determined before he is born, as a cow or a tree or a machine is. He is free - or rather, to be a true man is to be free to shape his own destiny. There is no rejection of law and order, but a sharp protest against law and order dominating man rather than serving him. The rejection of ontology and metaphysics is more resolute. Terms like "being" and "nature" are rejected in favour of others like "function", "reality" and "relation".

In theology, the secularizationist draws his inspiration from the three great B's of twentieth century Reformed (1)

(1) I include under this word the Reformed Jew and the neo-Lutherans.

thought - Buber, Barth and Bonhoeffer, with a liberal inhalation from that post-liberal genius of American social thought, Reinold Niebuhr. In the background lie the contributions of Biblical scholarship, especially the new Old Testament theology which sees the prophetic as the main stream of the experience of Israel, and the demythologized New Testament theology of that other great B, Rudolf Bultmann and his school.

There is even a Christian secularisationist "missiology" best exemplified in Dr. van Leeuwen's brilliant treatise "Christianity in World History", which sees secularization as the main thrust of God's saving activity from the time of the call of Israel from Egypt. For van Leeuwen salvation consists in the liberation of man from under the dominance of civilizations and religions with an "onto-cratic" pattern, to genuine and creative freedom in a secular society. The liberation of man is the mission of the Church, transforming societies even when they reject the Gospel in explicit terms. The spread of the urban-technological-industrial culture to all continents is itself an integral part, though an ambiguous one, of this process of desacralization and secularization.

The Christian Gospel is, for van Leeuwen, the Gospel of secularization. Christ Himself has won the victory over the Principalities and powers, and the Gospel continues its course in the history of the world exposing and overthrowing the powers that dominate and enslave man.

Van Leeuwen argues passionately in his concluding chapter that both Western and non-Western churches "ought to focus their theological reflection on the encounter with secularization". Any other central concern can lead the Church totally astray.

In his concluding chapter he gives an image, which in a sense pervades the whole book, of the nature of a "genuinely secular society". The Babylonians sought to build a city and a tower whose top reached up to heaven. God confused them in their proud attempt and frustrated their effort. All religions are attempts to build the tower whose top is in heaven.

The genuinely secular society, on the other hand, has left off building the tower, because they know that there is no heaven that is not man-made. "The tower of Babel has no top; and it is not the business of Christian theology to fill that vacuum" and to furnish a top. Our job as Christians is at the base, not at the top, to cooperate with non-Christians in a concerted effort to build ourselves a city, and a tower, but without a top reaching up to the heavens.

For van Leeuwen then true progress of the Gospel will not be manifested in the baptizing of more Gentiles to become members of the Christian Church, but rather in "the renewal of society in the direction of a truly secular and man-made order of life".(1)

(1) Christianity in World History, p. 420

"In this age of ours, 'Christianization' can only mean that peoples become involved in the onward movement of Christian history". As Hendrik Kraemer rightly asks in his foreword to the book, what does that mean?

Or to put it another way, can there be 'a genuinely secular society' from the Christian perspective? It depends very much on the ^{meaning} ~~answer~~ given to the word 'secular'. If it means time-existence, then there is no debate. All societies exist in time. If it means what the first paragraph of this paper mentions, then we have to discuss this definition in its two parts.

"A state of human relations in which no religion or world-view dominates" is not a practical possibility. We do not know of any such society existing at any time, including the present moment. Even modern science and technology have their origin in a 'religion' or a 'world-view', as Edwin A. Burtt demonstrates in his The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science or C.F. von Weizsäcker in his Zum Weltbild der Physik. Man can refuse to formulate his 'metaphysical' world-view, but he cannot live, think or act without such pre-suppositions consciously or unconsciously held. All one can hope for, within the limits of the human mind in its time-existence, is to be adequately aware of the tentative and hypothetical character of his world-view, and to be constantly on the alert to revise it in the light of experience and experiment.

Even if 'religion' were to be banished by the concerted efforts of the secularizationists, the secularists and the atheists, some world-views will still dominate. Not only the Marxists, but even Christian secularizationists do have a world-view. It may not be articulately or consciously held. But it is there. Their world-view may not be held as a final absolute, but they would like to see it dominate. Charles West and Arend van Leeuwen have world-views which they passionately advocate in their writings. This is not the place to discuss these implied world-views, but we have no other choice but to reject the first part of the definition of a secular society as practically impossible.

The second part is even more metaphysical: "Where no common sense of the timeless order of reality prevails". What the 'timeless order of reality' is seems difficult to conceive. Those religious schools like Vedanta or Zen Buddhism which seem to have such a conception insist that it is beyond human conception. It is without quality or extension. Christians can think only of God as belonging to the timeless order, since time belongs to creation and God is not part of it. We do not want to speak of the 'reality of God' as a secular reality, as Charles West does, since God is not simply a reality within the *seculum*, though our knowledge of that reality is secular, or acquired in time-existence. Certainly then, unless our definers advocate something like downright atheism, it appears impossible for Christians to "believe in one God the Father Almighty, maker

of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible" and not to have faith in some order of reality transcending time and space. If the emphasis is on "common" sense of that reality, then we do not have to worry too much, because even in the "Corpus Christianum" there were many different conceptions of God.

The problem of defining the meaning of "secular" in any satisfactory way has led the present writer to be skeptical of the efforts in that direction not only of his Christian friends in the West, but even of his own country's non-Christian Government. The anomalies of Indian 'secular' society have been adequately lampooned by critics both within and without the country.

Yet, it remains true that we are all groping towards a certain type of society for which we have as yet neither an adequate name nor an articulate theoretical conception. If one were tempted to speak of "authentic society" rather than "secular society" one soon discovers that Greek authentic means absolute away or absolute authority, (from autos = one who does something with his own hand). This may then come to mean that the "authentic" society recognizes no norms outside itself. This also cannot certainly be what the secularizationist seeks, who wants "to understand and live in these areas in the terms which they alone offer", but does not want to vest those terms with any degree of finality. Is it possible for a Christian to

conceive of a society which has no norms outside itself? would not the "declaration of human rights" of the U.N. come under the category of something which transcends the terms which society normally offers? On what secular basis do we assert the dignity of man or the principle of equity - on the basis of social experience?

We need, at least for our own internal use among Christians, a slightly different vocabulary. We cannot too easily find a surrogate term for the 'Kingdom of God manifesting itself in history', which is what we are groping for.

This Kingdom cannot be 'secular' in any 'authentic' sense. Its very roots would be in the transcendent eschaton, in that 'timeless order of reality' whence it has entered into the order of time-space.

A happier term may be "pluralistic human society", provided proper definitions are agreed upon for the words 'pluralistic' and 'human'. Pluralism means more than mere variety. Without some unity within the diversity we would simply have a chaotic or an anarchic rather than a pluralistic society. That element of unity should be spelt out as the definition of the term 'human'.

But this society cannot constantly be weeding out its own terms from within itself. It will need the presence of a transcendent unit within it, which will constantly challenge its attempts to become "autonomous" or providing its own norm.

This unit will normally be a small prophetic group within the Christian Church of the country, though they may be joined by men of good will who are not Christians. They will not do this challenging by any temporal authority vested in them. They may use all the normal channels provided within the structure of "law and order". But they would have the responsibility to decide in conscience when the challenge will have to assume extra-legal forms. This would mean the acceptance of suffering and opposition from the majority in society, and in cases death.

But this cannot be done by a group of people who have no transcendent loyalty, though radicalism can often go with professed atheism.

It would be strange indeed if the constitution were to provide for the 'right of conscience' to violate the constitution. That right in the final analysis will have to remain something which transcends the constitution itself, the right of appeal to the deepest elements of freedom in the human person.

The great yearning for a purely 'secular' society on the part of some western thinkers seems to be a reaction to the history of ecclesiastical and ideological domination in the Western past. As a 'reaction ideology' it may have a creative role to fulfil in battling the entrenched positions of the old order. It may even be aware of the danger of itself becoming an 'ideology'. Even with such caution, however, it cannot claim to become a substitute for the old

Christian pattern of social thinking.

What then are the elements of a 'pluralistic human society' as a Christian conceives it?

The concept of 'pluralism' comes, for the Christian, not from social experience, but rather from the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The concept of 'human' has similarly its roots not in the tradition of secular western or eastern humanism but rather in the fact of the incarnation itself.

It is methodologically important thus to start our Christian social thinking from these two fundamental realities of the Christian Faith, rather than from the Old Testament doctrines of the Call of Abraham, or the 'history of salvation'.

Underlying these twin doctrines of the Incarnation (1) and the Holy Spirit lie the fundamental concept of 'freedom in love'.

(1) It needs to be specified here that Incarnation as a theological term in Eastern Christian thought denotes the whole 'eikonomia', which begins with the Annunciation and ends with Pentecost and the coming into being of the Christian Church. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit is thus integral to the doctrine of the Incarnation.

Freedom is by definition not open to definition, since that which is defined is no longer free. Yet there are certain statements which could be made about freedom, the first of which is the one already made in the previous sentence.

'Freedom' is both a relational or functional concept as well as an 'ontological' or 'being' concept. The being of God is a 'free' being, and therefore does not lend itself to exhaustive definition or even exhaustive revelation. The revealed God is also a deus absconditus. He is Yahweh, God who will be what He is or is what He will be ('ehveh aher 'ehveh). This is undoubtedly an ontological statement about the Being of God; but not about a static Being, who can be defined even by this statement.

When we say therefore that God is 'free' we do not mean that as a definition of God. It means primarily that God's being is not determined by anything outside it, but by His own will.

And that will is free - free not only from external constraint or bondage, but also free to fulfil that which it wills. That is the twin meaning of freedom - absence of heteronomy and the presence of infinite power to accomplish that which is willed.

"God is love" is also a Biblical statement, though not the converse "Love is God" (1). Love exists only in a

(1) See Bishop Robinson's Honest to God

context of freedom in a community of persons. Love also defies definition. But some statements could be made about it. It is nothing less than beneficent intersubjectivity in freedom, the principle of inter-personal relationships within the Holy Trinity and therefore of human relationships within society.

This twin principle has, as far as we can see, an enduring validity for all societies. And therefore we need to consider it in connection with the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Man, at least in Eastern thought, is made in the image of God. Jesus Christ is the image or eikon of God. An icon is not a representation of someone who is absent (as often in the case of a photograph or a statue) but the mark of a presence. The presence of Man in the Creation is thus a concrete presence of God within it. Jesus Christ is the presence par excellence of God, not only within history, but also in physical nature. 'God became flesh' is not simply a historical statement, but something related equally to physical reality or nature. "Became" refers to history, "flesh" related to matter or nature.

Any separation of history and 'nature' seems therefore contrary to the incarnation. The Incarnation is both 'ontic' and historical.

It is also an act of 'love in freedom'. God could have saved the world by 'fiat', since He is free and His will is

unbounded. But precisely because He is free, and man is made to be His eikon in love and freedom, he chose the means of incarnate involvement rather than imperious fiat.

The tragedy of Corpus Christianum is in the forgetting of this fundamental principle. The 'two-edged sword' of medieval papacy, as well as the 'cuius regio eius religio' principle of the Lutheran Reformation both militated against this principle of the Incarnation.

In a genuinely pluralistic human society, imposition of religious or political views by fiat rather than loving persuasion cannot be brooked.

But this gives rise immediately to the related question of the role of authority, law and punishment in such a society.

Here the fundamental consideration/^{is} that the Incarnation does not bring about a radical break with the past. Automatic righteousness which needed no law was often associated with the hopes of a Messianic age. But in practice the tension between the external authority of the law and the loving and wise actions of freedom continued to manifest itself even in the Apostolic community. The 'royal law' - "Love thy neighbour as thyself" - comprehends statutory law, but until society achieves maturity, statutory law will be the form in which most of the negative and some of the positive requirements of the royal law will be met. For

example, statutory law can regulate murder but not hatred; give structure to service to the needy (through social security or other forms of taxation) but not to compassion as a free expression of inter-subjectivity.

Authority and law have in the pluralistic human society to be constituted as frameworks which can be finally dispensed with, when voluntary love, or beneficent inter-subjectivity in freedom can progressively grow to fruition. This is why neither law nor authority can be ultimate in society. Education, through family, school or "mass media", should be seen as a tool in the progressive elimination of authoritarian legal structures and the introduction of higher and higher degrees of voluntary beneficence. Punishment yields to correctional education, no longer seen as a deterrent by fear to others, but as a means of redemption of the culprit himself.

Law and order thus become relative to the ultimate objective, the production of creative inter-subjectivity in freedom. Revolution becomes a necessary corrective to outmoded structures of law and order rather than a threat to security and well-being.

The transition from a law-and order state to a welfare state can thus be seen as a progressive step towards the kingdom; yet the welfare state itself stands under the judgment of the principle of creative and beneficent inter-subjectivity in freedom. In so far as it stifles freedom

and promotes lazy parasitism, it is itself to be re-structured and remodeled to promote maximum freedom and initiative.

The growth of democracy can also be seen in the favourable light of this principle. What was wrong with the notion of kingship? Certainly not the "ontocratic pattern" which it represented, but rather its failure to develop creative and responsible freedom in all members of the society. The "ontocratic pattern", whatever that strange term may really mean, was part of the framework used by royal societies to bolster the authority of kingship, which it considered essential to a stable and viable social structure. In democracy, greater demands are made on the freedom of persons in society, but democracy itself is less of an ultimate value than part of a necessary structure for the current stage of development of society.

The establishment of democracy itself, however, requires arrival at a stage where personal responsibility has attained some maturity. To impose democracy prematurely can come only from a false absolutization of a structural principle without historical perspective, and can endanger the true development of personal freedom.

The problem that ^{Some African countries} ~~Ghana~~ faced an attainment of independence is very much in point. Adult franchise was extended to all. But the structure of tribal authority had not yet been broken down. As a result, the tribal chief

decided for whom the members of his tribe should vote. The authority of the chief had been abolished by law, but the education of a tribal people to assume responsibility for national decisions had not yet developed. The end result was that those elected to Government were defenders of the interests of the tribal chiefs and thus a total denial of democracy.

The same can be said for the progress of "secularization". The abolition of ecclesiastical domination requires the development of personal freedom. In Soviet Russia, the authority of the Church and the feudal lords was ruthlessly abolished, only to be replaced by the equally arbitrary authority of what Milovan Djilas called the "New Class" of bureaucratic party and government officials. The creative and responsible freedom of persons in society has thus been slow in developing. It is not simply the "ontocratic" ideology of Marxism-Leninism that is to be blamed here, but rather the failure to come to grips with the fundamental principle of "love in freedom".

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The Place of the Church in a Pluralistic Human Society

The destruction of the Temple (A.D. 70) is often adduced as an argument for desecralization and secularization. Nothing could be more misleading.

The meaning of the cleansing of the Temple at the beginning of the ministry was symbolic of the destruction

of the temple to follow the establishment of the Church.

The Temple is totally misunderstood if conceived as a symbol of the "ontocratic" pattern. For the Jews it was the nikon of the "presence" of Yahweh in the midst of his covenant people. The shekinah-presence in the temple and in the person of Christ (Johannine prologue (1)) are serially related to each other. The one prefigures the other to which it is related as antetype. Equally important is the Old Testament figure of the ladder which reaches up to heaven in Jacob's dream, which van Leeuwen would too easily assimilate to the "ontocratic pattern" and not to the more Biblical theme of antetype and fulfillment. In the fourth Gospel Christ is the true ladder (Jn. 1:51).

So also in the Second Chapter of the Fourth Gospel, Christ is the true temple. He boldly calls the temple "my father's house", (ho oikos tou patros mou) and goes on to identify it with the "temple of his body" (ho naos tou somatos mou) (2). The first phrase is repeated again in the 14th chapter, as the place which he is going to prepare for his disciples.

The destruction of the Temple is thus to be seen as the result of its replacement by a living temple.

(1) Jn. 1:14

(2) Jn. 2:16-21

"We (plural) are the temple of the living God" (1) The temple is the new community. God is now to be encountered by Jews and Gentiles, not at Jerusalem, but wherever the community is. There is no "desecralization" or "secularization" but the fulfilment of the ante-type of the Temple, by its archetype, Christ and His Body the Church.

The new Temple, not made with hands, continues to remain in the midst of the world, as the organism of the new community, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner stone. This is a recurring theme in the New Testament, (2) which we can afford to overlook only at great peril to the very core of our faith.

The Church, always seen as the great new community in heaven and earth and not merely as an institution, has this function to fulfil as long as the 'saeculum' lasts. If in the 21st chapter of the book of Revelation, where the heavenly Jerusalem is seen descending from God, the seer "saw no temple in the city", the reason is given - the presence of God is manifest, and there is no longer any need for the community to be the veiled presence of God. But the total removal of the temple happens in the eschaton, not in time. And, in another sense, the holy city itself is the Temple where God is present.

(1) II Cor. 6:16 cf. I Cor. 3:16ff, 6:19

(2) See I Cor. 3:9-16, 17; 6:19, II Cor. 5:1; 6:16;

Eph. 2: 19 ff; I Peter 2:4 ff; Heb. 5:6

The Church therefore has to be the "sacred temple" of God in the *seculum*. The *seculum* without the Church is not in God's plan. And we must see the establishment of the Christian Church in nearly all countries of the world in the light of its special role within the *seculum*. We should not despise the Church for its smallness and insignificance, and respect only the "mundigkeit" of the world simply because the latter seems more impressive in its achievements and significance.

The Church can be called a secular reality, only in so far as it manifests itself in time. But the Church certainly transcends the *seculum*. If it is truly the risen and ascended Body of Christ, then its limits are not set by the curvature of the time-space cosmos. Its foundation is in Jesus Christ, Who is seated at the right hand of the Father. He was present in the time-space world at a certain point, namely Palestine in the first century. But that is not where we encounter him today.

The ascension is an integral part of the Incarnation. Jesus told his disciples that it was necessary for him to ascend to the Father. Only so could he prepare an abiding place for them. The very existence of the Church was a consequence of Ascension and Pentecost, both of which are events linking Time with the trans-temporal.

The presence of this trans-temporal "secular" society within human society alone gives the latter meaning and purpose. The Church serves the society in which it is

placed, in a three-fold sense:

- (a) as the Temple of God in the midst of time-space existence;
- (b) as the Royal Priesthood within that temple;
- (c) as the model and pattern for the human common-wealth.

To think of the Church as placed in time-space only to preach the Gospel constitutes a major inadequacy in Reformation ecclesiology.

True, the Church exists to proclaim the Gospel and to speak the prophetic word about the will of God for the world. But the very performance of that function is dependent on its fulfilment of her three-fold vocation in the Holy Spirit. And to a preliminary elucidation of this three-fold task we should now turn.

(a) The Temple of God

Modern secular man claims to be so de-sacralized that he has no longer any use for temples. But this is a theologian's misreading of the secular man's situation. He needs a temple, and desperately longs for it - a place where he can encounter the living God. Modern literature is full of veiled or explicit references to this deep pang of hunger in the secular man's consciousness. Both those who proclaim that "God is dead" and those who are either seeking to be "honest to God" or "waiting for Godt" give expression to this need.

The tragedy of modern man's secular existence is that, asking for bread, he is given a stone. Looking for the living God in the Church, he finds the dead stone of the theologian's concept of God. If there were a Christian community which would truly serve as a living temple of the Living God, secular man would have encountered God there. We have in the past half-a-dozen centuries so conceptualized our theology that God also has become merely a concept, considered necessary by some in order to close the gap in our structure of thought.

Wherever secular man encounters a Christian community which expresses in its worship and life the authentic presence of God, he is drawn to it. He may complain of forms which are archaic and which therefore hinder his acceptance. But accommodation to forms familiar to modern man or to his canons about the use of language will not in itself make the encounter any the less problematic. In fact such accommodation, indiscriminately pursued, can fall into the trap of making God again something within secular man's understanding and thus no longer a challenge to that erroneous and self-sufficient conceptual structure.

The Church exists in the midst of secular society as something that does not easily fit in. That is its vocation. It cannot be the Temple of God, if it becomes merely a lecture-room or "a Gospel hall". If God is to ^{totally}

other" and He has to be encountered, then the time and place of that theophany has to be distinct from the time-space of ordinary existence. The Church need not set out to be archaic, obscure, irrelevant and peculiar. But if it is the community of the Holy Spirit, it will express itself in forms that do not fit in with the "secularized" world.

How the Community is to become such a temple will be clarified as we proceed.

(b) ^oThe Ryal Priesthood. The models offered by the New Testament for the nature of Christian existence should certainly baffle the philosophers of logical analysis. The community is both the temple (house of the Spirit) and the corps of priests (I Peter 2:5). We need to make it clear that when we speak of the "Church" we speak neither of the building nor of the structures of ecclesiastical authority, but of the whole Christian community in time-space and beyond.

This community, only an aspect of which appears in the present moment of the temporal flow, exercises continuously its priesthood as its primary vocation. Christ is the priest of Creation, Who on behalf of the created order, offers Himself perpetually to God the Father. In the life and death of Christ the creation said the "yes" of freedom and love to its Creator. There is no greater vocation for the Church than to continue to manifest this

"yes" in its worship. Worship is neither ancillary nor subsidiary to mission. Worship is the characteristic act of the Church, participating in the characteristic act of Christ its head.

Without the recovery of authentic worship the Church can neither be the Temple of God nor the proclaimer of the Word. But we do not recover authentic worship in order to better proclaim the word of God. True worship is in itself sufficient *raison d'être* for the existence of the Church.

No secular society can be authentic or genuine without the presence therein of the Christian community as Temple of God and Royal Priesthood.

But to be the Royal Priesthood also means to be in a perpetual ministry of self-offering and intercession. Continuous worship and prayer by the Church in the midst of the secular community preserves, transforms and sanctifies that community, often without its knowledge, sometimes against its will. The causal connection between worship and social change may be obscure. But faith insists that prayer changes.

While on the one hand worship is an act of freedom and love, not subsidiary to anything else, it is on the other hand also true that worship and prayer become instrumental in the transformation of society itself. Christ was a man of action. So were the apostles, at least some of them. But much more of the time of Christ and his apostles were

spent in prayer than in action.

Secularizationists seem to be temperamentally incapable of praying. They render lip service to prayer. (There are exceptions, like Bonhoeffer himself). But they put their trust mainly in their own words and action. Claiming to be prophets, they miss the secret of the prophets - sustained and disciplined prayer - the true mark of the Royal Priesthood as well. The secular society that they are struggling for thus faces the peril of becoming anything but authentic.

(c) The model and pattern for the human commonwealth

It is perhaps only an idle dream or a pious wish. But the Church is called to be the manifestation of the Kingdom of God in history. And that Kingdom has three fundamental principles, all inter-related: Love, freedom, and wisdom. The Spirit is the bringer of all three. He is the Spirit of love (Rom. 5:5; 9:30; I Cor. 4:21; Col. 1:8), the spirit of freedom (Rom. 8:15; II Cor. 3:17), and the spirit of wisdom (I Cor. 2:10ff, Eph. 1:17).

In the second epistle to Timothy, these concepts are brought together: "God has not given us the spirit of fear; but of power, and of love, and of a sound mind" (II Tim. 1:7).

The Spirit works in the whole of creation, as in all things He works with God in Christ for the fulfilment of His purposes.

Three things need to be said about the nature of the Holy Spirit Himself before we speak of love, freedom and wisdom as the three principles of a genuine "pluralistic human society".

First, the Holy Spirit dwells in the community of the Church, but works in the whole of creation.

Second, the Holy Spirit works in the individual person, but always in relating him to God and to other human persons.

Third, the Holy Spirit works ^{not} ~~out~~ compulsively but only in the openness of freedom. The Spirit becomes the agent in a person or society without abolishing the subjectivity of the personal or social agent in whom He operates.

The Church, which knows the Holy Spirit, opens for Him the channel for working both within the Church and within human society as a whole.

The Church, as a true community of the Holy Spirit, is open at both ends, to God and to the world.

The Church does its work in the world, not compulsively by ecclesiastical domination, but by identification with the world in such a way that the world itself continues to be an agent and is not reduced to a passive listener or recipient.

It is in this sense that the Church becomes a model and pattern for the human commonwealth.

The Three Principles

We should now seek to spell out in more detail the three principles of a "pluralistic human society". It should be kept in mind that these three "principia" have their origin in the very being of God, and in so far as the Church manifests these, it becomes a theophany or the temple of God.

(a) Freedom

Freedom has no definition - neither has love or wisdom. All three have their origin in God. One of the few things we can say about God is that He is free, loving and wise. In fact He is freedom, love and wisdom. One should be careful about making "is-statements" about God. He is. That is true. But to have a "subjective complement" to the simple verb "is" can be dangerous, for that would be trying to define God.

And yet neither freedom, nor love, nor wisdom is a definitive concept. They are not only dynamic. They derive their very meaning from the "being" or "is-ness" of God, which is itself beyond definition, and constantly free.

Freedom is more than the liberty of choice, or the absence of external constraint.

Freedom means the possibility of realizing that which one wills, unhindered by external constraint or lack of power. Power is in this sense synonymous with freedom. Lack of power is lack of freedom.

God alone is free. He wills, and it is done. There is nothing "outside" of Him that limits His freedom, except that which He has willed to create. But even the creation does not exist "outside" of God. It is always in Him, and therefore under His power.

Man is made "in the image" of God, therefore made for freedom. In Christ, man is adopted as the Son of God. "The sons are free"; says our Lord in Mt. 17:26. We have been called "into the freedom of the glory of the children of God" (Romans 8:21). Christ has freed man for freedom. (Gal. 5:1).

Stemming from St. Augustine, there exists, especially in the western tradition, what Eric Fromm calls "the fear of freedom". There is a spiritual grandeur in Augustine's "da quod iubes, et iube quod vis" (give what Thou commandest and command what Thou wilt). Pelagius, the pragmatic Britisher, certainly misunderstood it. But the tradition of Western theology which makes God the sole agent and man the passive recipient, also misunderstand the delicate work of the Holy Spirit who refuses to storm the citadel of man's resistance but acts through inner prompting without abolishing subjectivity and freedom. In the lives of both St. Paul and

St. Augustine, the free seeking of God's will and the acceptance of it were activated by the Holy Spirit without suppressing the agency of man. It should not be forgotten that Augustine had a specific reference in this petition - namely for continence and purity. He made that choice and asked for it. It is theologically dangerous to assert that God acts and man simply receives, or that God commands and man obeys. That kind of obedience leads not to maturity in freedom. The adulthood of man requires the development of freedom, not only of dependence. "The freedom in either direction" which is peculiarly man's, Pelagius called "the glory of our rational nature".(1) He and Augustine alike erred, however, in treating the question of freedom in terms of the ability to sin or not to sin, and in conceiving of sin primarily in individualistic and moralistic terms. John Cassian, whose Eastern heritage helped him to see that both sides erred, was however unable to point out the locus of the error. He thus lapsed into the equally unsatisfactory compromise of semi-pelagianism and Synergism. The Council of Orange simply ratified the error of St. Augustine in somewhat less profound but more precise terms.

The fear of freedom, which denies freedom to error, too easily assumes its own possession of the truth.

(1) Pelagius, Epistula ad Demetriadem, Migne, P.L. 33:1100

The Church thus sought to guard the truth both by temporal power and by exact formulation. What we are witnessing from the time of the Reformation till now is the revolt against both the false claim and the attempted human defense of the truth. That very revolt, however, has led to new errors which made individual judgment the arbiter of truth and which developed a new corpus of pseudo-biblical truth. The present secular revolt is an assertion of the freedom of man over against the dogmatic formulations on both sides of the sixteenth century controversy. Science itself has sprung out of the revolt of man against both Catholicism and the Reformation, and can therefore hardly be called a "product of Christianity" as van Leu²_uwen seeks to do.

Science has its roots in the freedom of man rather than in Christianity. Confronted by the (apparently) mutually contradictory authority of "Church" and "Bible", modern man slowly discovered the experimental or pragmatic notion of truth which bases itself neither on dogmatic authority nor on individual judgment, but on repeatable, demonstrable, public experiments, and eventually on the laws of mathematics.

Technology has also its roots in the freedom of man. Man belongs to the biological continuum of evolution and has been carried along by it. The evolution of his consciousness has also been his emancipation from the blind stream of evolution. He now becomes aware of himself

and his environment. Instead of being transmuted by the forces of the cosmos, he seeks to understand these forces and to transmute them and himself. Not only modern technology, but even primitive man's patterns of social organization and methods of farming and forging tools belong to this story of the evolution of human freedom. As the Greeks said it, technè and politike were the gifts of the gods to men.

Modern science and technology belong to this continuum which has its origin in pre-Christian and extra-Hebraic society. It was not after the Hebrews challenged the Babylonian "ontocrats" that science and technology began. Wherever men learned through experience and devised tools, there were science and technology. They belonged to the freedom of man to emancipate himself from the cosmic forces and to gain control of them.

There has however been an unprecedented acceleration of the development of science and technology in recent times. But this acceleration cannot be too easily attributed to an event in the history of Western Christianity which could be described as the overthrow of "ontocratic" patterns by "theocratic" patterns. That thesis can be substantiated only by the wishful thinking of frustrated western missionaries. Most thinkers even in the West would agree to a different analysis of the roots of the technocratic revolution, not the least of which was the steady inflow of raw materials from the colonies and the ready market the colonies provided

for the products of West European industry.

But our purpose here is not to debate the origins of science and technology, but to place them in relation to power and freedom. The Christian conception in the past has always tended to look at power as at least neutral if not evil. This again springs from a basic misunderstanding. The ability first to transcend the evolutionary process through self-awareness and through understanding of the environment, and then to transmute the direction of the evolutionary process itself by changes in self and in the environment - this ability is an integral part of human freedom. In so far as they contribute to the creation of that ability science and technology - as well as the power derived from them - are good, not evil or neutral.

One must also hail the gladdening light of freedom even when its emergence is accompanied by acute suffering. The emergence of the Congolese people, for example, from the Belgian yoke, may not appear as an unmitigated good. It is accompanied by savage and brutal acts of inhuman cruelty. Is it not destroying the dignity of man? Would it not have been better if Belgium could have kept the Congolese under tutelage for another thirty or sixty years as they had originally intended? The answer is an unequivocal no. Freedom could not have emerged in Western Europe if the primary concern there had been for non-violence, law and order and all that. Some lessons have to be learned by

experience. If Europe, after centuries of "civilization" has not yet learned to avoid war and to respect the dignity of one's fellow-men, one should give the Congolese at least half a generation in which to come to terms with their own situation.

Freedom should be welcomed by the Christian, even where it is exercised against forces favourable to Christianity and the Church. Freedom should be granted also ^{to} error, since the truth cannot be afraid of error. Every advancement of knowledge and power for mankind should be heartily, and not reluctantly, welcomed by the Christian Church.

There remains, however, areas where freedom does not so easily emerge. The New Testament speaks of freedom as being free from sin, law, and death (Romans 6-8). Man's bondage to evil and guilt, to dependence on heteronomous structures and to fear of death as well as to disintegration of personality and society, should also be broken, if a genuinely human society is to emerge.

The greatest problem of freedom, however, is the possibility of its dissociation from love and wisdom.

(b) Love and Justice. To say that "justice" is an approximation of love can be misleading. Both justice and love are social realities. But justice understood in the traditional Roman sense seems somewhat more opposed to love than approximating it. In the concept of justice, there is

the underlying notion of rights and duties, which do not properly belong to love.

This is the crisis of western society. It has proceeded on the assumption that "social justice" is the highest value in the Kingdom, and has failed to see the great gap between this and love.

The end result is that while Western societies are incomparably more "just" than societies in Eastern Europe or in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the fact remains that genuine inter-subjectivity is becoming increasingly problematic in the West.

Here we come also into the delicate question of structures and persons. Can "love" be built into structures? Justice certainly can. But justice belongs primarily to the area of external actions, and cannot deal directly with the "inner" man. (1) It can be built into the structures. Even the maintenance of justice, however, cannot be assured by the structures. Where men are willing to sacrifice their freedom for the sake of some lesser good,

(1) Bonhoeffer denies the existence of any distinction between inner and outer man in the Bible. This is surprising in a man who knew his Bible rather well and must have read Romans 7:22, II Cor. 4:16 and Eph. 3:16 often.

justice always succumbs despite all structures. To think therefore of the "principalities and powers" as primarily resident in the power structures is a gross over-simplification for which we will have to pay dearly if we persist in it.

The demonic cannot be kept out by structures of any kind. Only the vigilance of human freedom and love, combined with divine wisdom, can wage the battle against the principalities and powers.

Social injustice is indeed demonic, and the demons ought to be unseated from the control-chambers of society. Even within the justest social structures, however, the most demonic of all forces, namely the denial of freedom and love, can hold sway.

But what is this love that we oppose to justice? It is of course the greatest gift of the Spirit, greater than the power of miracles or of speaking in tongues. It is the one gift that is given to all, and without which all other gifts of the spirit are of no avail. (I Cor. 13:1+3) All social actions and all acts of sacrifice are without value if unaccompanied by love. Even faith, without love, is nothing.

We should first take love out of the realm of the merely sentimental and emotional. But love does involve sentiments and emotions as well as the will and the mind.

In his famous ode to love, St. Paul begins to describe it by the concepts of large-heartedness (makrothumia) and kindness (chrèstotès). Our own traditional understanding of love has two principles which are contradictory to the Pauline understanding, namely limitation and possession. One loves someone more than one loves others. One has almost to exclude others, in order to love one! We choose the person whom we love. Even in family love, love is limited to those who are related to us by blood or marriage. Especially in romantic love, the objective of love is the possession of the beloved.

In Christian love, the range has to be as wide as humanity. Whoever the man is with whom I am confronted, I am to love him. Samaritan, Jew and Gentile are alike. Humanity is the limit. And com-passion rather than possession is the method. We enter into the other's being, feel, think and act with him and in his best interests. We allow him to enter into ours as well. This is true com-passion, true kindness, true inter-subjectivity. It is not simply dialogue or communication, but rather communion, or koinonia, the word we often translate as "fellowship". This ability to enter into all men, and the openness to all men that they may enter into one is the precondition of love, as well as its primary expression.

This kind of inter-subjectivity can hardly be built into structures of social justice, though these structures are necessary for the exercise of love. A truly pluralistic

human society is one where love exists. A just society does not guarantee love. Love can exist even where there is social injustice. But without love even the just society perishes.

(c) Wisdom. Knowledge is not wisdom. Knowledge can assist wisdom, but the two can exist apart from each other.

The foundation of wisdom is truth itself, not the knowledge of truth.

The Spirit is always the spirit of truth. Our Lord promised "the Spirit of Truth" (Jn. 14:17) who leads us into truth itself (Jn 16:13), not merely to a knowledge of it.

Wisdom is a "being-category" rather than a functional one. One has to be in the truth in order to be wise. (Jn. 8:44). To "know the truth" (Jn. 8:32) is to participate in it, to stand in it (Jn. 8:44).

True freedom and true love require being in the truth. The movement from falsehood to truth is faith (the fear of the Lord) and the beginning of wisdom.

Time-space existence can be false existence. To be ek tou kosmou is false existence. If the ground of one's existence is the time-space world, then that existence is founded on that which is not true. The true is that which abides. The world passes away. The *seculum* is a flow, a passing away. The only way of finding true existence in the evanescent course of time-existence is to have one's

foundations in something that transcends that course, and abides "for ever".

The only absolute truth within the seculum is the presence of God in it. The Incarnation is not so much a "revelation" as a presence. Christ can therefore say that He is the truth. The Johannine prologue can therefore say "we beheld ~~this~~ glory, full of grace and truth".

The precondition of wisdom is not so much the "knowledge" (in the sense of cognition) of this truth, but "knowledge" (in the Hebrew sense) by participation in Him.

If our objectives in life as well as the foundation of our life do not go beyond the seculum, then we are still in the folly of human wisdom. Our decisions, our purposes, our science and technology, cannot provide an adequate and abiding foundation for our life. These can be properly utilized only when the foundation of our life itself is in the truth.

Wisdom comes by the hearing of the Gospel, by faith in Christ, and by Baptism into His Body, which alone abides. When we are in the Body of Christ, and not in our own bodies, then the Spirit helps us to grow into wisdom.

If this be the case, then the question legitimately arises, can there be wisdom outside the Church, in a "pluralistic human society"? The answer is that the question is wrongly posed. The Church-world relationship cannot be

seen as two mutually exclusive spheres. The Church penetrates the world, as the "soul" does the body, to borrow a rather archaic analogy. The Church exists with the world, in identification with it.

This is not a cheap claim that whatever good exists in the world belongs to the Church by right. The Spirit of Truth operates in the whole creation. Even where conscious faith in Christ does not exist, even where there has been no sacramental baptism into the Body of Christ, "the Spirit bloweth where it listeth" and no man can pinpoint Him.

Again this is not a question of the Church appropriating for itself the wisdom that exists in the world and offering it to God. As Etienne Gilson once said, that ^{would be} ~~is~~ too facile, if the ~~scientists~~ ^{were} and technicians ~~are~~ to do all the work, and the lazy Christians ^{to} pick it up and offer it to God.

Pluralism is a true pre-condition of wisdom. The Church has no monopoly on wisdom.

Let us avoid confusion at this point by recalling our earlier distinction between knowledge and wisdom. It seems God's purpose that the pursuit of knowledge should take place largely extra-ecclesially. But this does not mean that the Church can too lightly take this knowledge and transmute it into wisdom. It appears that God wills the Church's being dependent on the experience of the whole world for its own wisdom. There is a good reason for our "dialogue" not only

with "secular" man but also with "religious" men of all faiths. But neither does the Church selfishly delve wisdom for itself, profiting from the experience of the whole world.

The wisdom that the Spirit gives is for the whole world, that it may know how to use its freedom to live. The Church works in identification with the world, open to the Spirit, that the way of wisdom may be opened to all mankind. She has the advantage of having been consciously liberated from anxiety, ^{from} guilt and from the need for false security and self-justification, the two great enemies of wisdom. It can therefore act as a catalyst in liberating groups in the world from their folly of seeking false security and self-justification.

The wisdom of history teaches us that the Church needs opposition and external criticism in order to be faithful to its own calling. It seems therefore a decree of God that the Church can find true wisdom only in a pluralistic society. The tragedy of Western theology is precisely its development in an essentially homogeneous society. As pluralism develops in the West and the Western Church is thrown into a pluralistic world society, it can be hoped that she will grow more transparent in her wisdom and thus benefit the whole world, which at present the West seeks to dominate with its consciousness of a special corner on wisdom and knowledge.

Conclusions

(1) The work of the Holy Spirit informing the Christian community has its repercussions and parallels in non-Christian society as well. The Church cannot therefore devote itself exclusively to a so-called "pre-existence" for the world, without being mindful of the work of the Spirit in the Christian community itself and its significance for the world.

(2) The idea of a "secular" society is one to which the Christian cannot subscribe. Society has to be pluralistic, with freedom for all religions and no-religion.

(3) The development of freedom, love and wisdom in the whole community is a concern of the Church which it should share with all mankind.

(4) The Church has the task of representing in history as the temple of God where men may encounter Him, and where sacrifices are continually offered to the Creator on behalf of the Creation.